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Direct Democracy and
Civic Maturation
by ALAN HIRSCH*
Introduction
Americans have grown deeply dissatisfied with government,'
convinced that our elected officials care more about feathering their
own nests and guaranteeing their reelection than serving the
commonweal.2 Ordinary citizens believe that their representatives
pay heed to the whims of wealthy and powerful special interests
rather than to the public interest.3
Unsurprisingly, the sense of failure of representative government
has increased talk of expanding direct democracy, whereby the
People themselves make laws.4 Predictably, debate about direct
* J.D. 1985, Yale Law School.
1. See, e.g., David Broder, Whose Government Is This?: Poll Finds Public Feels It
Belongs to Parties, Lobbyists, Media, WASH. POST, July 13, 1999, at A7 (discussing
national poll showing deep distrust of government); Scott Shepard, U.S. Vote Data Show
Trend Toward Apathy, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 17, 1998, at A6 (citing new Census
Bureau report showing that voter turnout in 1996 presidential election was lowest in 70
years and voter registration, despite laws making it easier to register, was lowest in 30
years).
2. See Broder, supra note 1 ("Only one in four [of those polled] thought the
government pursues the public interest and the people's agenda, rather than special
interests or its own agenda.").
3. Some representatives agree. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) opines that
American politics has become "an influence-peddling scheme in which both parties
compete to stay in office by selling the country to the highest bidder." David S. Broder, A
Battle of Bank Accounts, WASH. POST, July 7, 1999, at A19.
4. Elizabeth Garrett, Perspectives on Direct Democracy: Who Directs Direct
Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 17 (1997) ("The appeal of popular
lawmaking is no surprise given the growing public disillusionment with elected
representatives."). Procedures for direct democracy already exist in the District of
Columbia and [the] following twenty-four states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. One respected pundit predicts that nationwide
[185]
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democracy has spilled into the legal academic community! The
debate has two principal prongs: the extent to which direct democracy
meshes with American doctrine and tradition (i.e., the constitutional
text and the views of the founding fathers), and the desirability of
direct democracy on various public policy grounds.
Along with my co-author Akhil Amar, I entered that debate on
the side of direct democracy.' However, Professor Amar and I
observed that not all forms of direct democracy are alike, and we
called for procedures that would minimize the risks posed by direct
democracy while maximizing its potential. We made broad and
tentative observations about the kinds of procedures we have in
mind, leaving for another day consideration of a blueprint for direct
democracy.7
This article seeks to take that next step, to address not simply
whether citizens should make laws, but how. Getting to this point
requires retracing some previous steps and building a stronger case
for direct democracy than has heretofore been made (including by
Professor Amar and myself).
Part I of this essay argues that, contrary to the prevailing view in
the legal community, the founding fathers believed in direct
democracy, and the Constitution embodies it. Part II reviews the
public policy arguments, and the experience with direct democracy in
the states. Part III makes an essentially new argument in favor of
direct democracy: At this point in our history, it is needed to achieve
the civic maturation of the American citizenry and polity. Building
on Parts II and III, Part IV contemplates a new model of direct
democracy. Specifically, I analyze the efforts of a group called
Philadelphia II to introduce direct democracy to every jurisdiction in
America in a way that would promote fairness and deliberation.
Finally, Part V analyzes the means by which Philadelphia II seeks to
enact its proposal.
initiative will soon become a visible national issue. See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY
DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY 1 (2000).
5. Whereas there was a limited literature until recently, the 1990s witnessed literally
dozens of articles on direct democracy. See Garrett, supra note 4, at 36 (noting
"[i]ncreased scholarly interest in direct democracy").
6. AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 3-47 (1998). Part I of the present
essay borrows liberally from our book which, in turn, borrowed liberally from Professor
Amar's earlier scholarship, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
7. AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 26-27, 46-47.
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I. The Framers and Direct Democracy
Opponents of direct democracy cite the Framers of our
Constitution as allies.8 They argue that the Framers consciously
rejected directed democracy in favor of representative democracy.
First, on the federal level, the Constitution sets up a representative
democracy as opposed to a direct democracy. It spells out how the
People elect legislators who, along with an elected President, make
the laws. The Constitution does not set forth direct lawmaking by the
People.
Second, while the Constitution focuses on the organization of the
federal government, Article IV, Section 4 says the United States
"shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government." Opponents of direct democracy argue that a
republican form of government means representative government,
and conclude that the Framers envisioned representative democracy,
as opposed to direct democracy, at the state as well as federal level. 9
Finally, the Framers made it extremely difficult to change these
(and all other) features of the Constitution, crafting laborious
procedures for amending the document."° Because amendments
require super-majorities, and require ample involvement and support
from elected officials, the Constitution itself is distanced from direct
democracy.
I believe that the above misreads the evidence in several
respects, and that it is problematic to enlist the Framers as opponents
of direct democracy.
A. Federal Government-The Problem of Size
While the Framers did establish representative rather than direct
democracy as the means of federal lawmaking, it is easy to draw the
wrong inference from that datum. Certainly, they were under no
illusion that elected officials perfectly represent their constituents. In
the United States House of Representatives, the more accountable of
the two branches of Congress (since its members face election every
two years), each member has numerous constituents. This fact alone
renders it impossible for a "representative" to truly represent any
voter, and the House operates in a one-industry town of power
8. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Democracy? 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 709, 722 (1994).
9. Id.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. V. See also infra text accompanying note 48.
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brokers, which is hardly conducive to representing the ordinary
citizen.
Frequent elections do require members of Congress to pay some
attention to their constituents. However, the constant pressure to
keep wealthy campaign contributors happy further weakens the bond
between representatives and the average citizen." The threat of
removing unresponsive representatives would not suffice in any
event. Elections rarely present a simple choice: Each candidate is a
complex combination of positions, record, character, party affiliation,
and potential seniority in the legislature .
The Framers keenly understood the distance between the most
popular branch of government and the People. In Federalist 71,
Alexander Hamilton noted disapprovingly that representatives "seem
sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves."" For that
reason, James Madison argued, "The people ought to indulge all their
jealousy and exhaust all their precautions" to restrain "the
enterprising ambition" of our representatives."
Given this, why did the Framers establish a representative
democracy at the federal level? The principal reason was practical:
the country was too large for direct democracy. As John Adams put
the point, "In a large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is
impossible that the whole should assemble to make laws. The first
necessary step, then, is to delegate power. .... ""
Permitting all voters to vote on issues would have meant
sacrificing the ideal of deliberative democracy. The Framers regarded
deliberation as the sine qua non of lawmaking. In the very first
sentence of The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton reminded
people that they were called upon not merely to vote but to
11. While the influence of money was far less pronounced at the founding, no one
doubted that some constituents had more clout than others. The problems of
representation were and are worse in the Senate than the House: the ratio of constituent
to Senator is higher, the term of office longer, and the cost of campaigns greater.
12. In a development not fully foreseen by the Framers, Congress' seniority system
gives voters in every district a disincentive to remove their incumbent: A new
representative generally translates into less pork for the district. The result, at times, is
what economists call a "collective action" problem: Everyone wants to throw the bums
out, but most vote to keep their own bum in.
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 13, at 309.
15. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVES,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 14 (1989) (quoting John Adams).
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"deliberate on a new Constitution.' '16  The theme of deliberation
permeates the Framers' own deliberations on the Constitution. For
example, in Federalist 68, Hamilton explained that the proposed
system of electing presidents is designed to produce "circumstances
favorable to deliberation."17
James Fishkin cogently argues that the Framers' attitude about
direct democracy is captured by the conflict in Rhode Island over
how to ratify the Constitution. 8 Some Rhode Islanders insisted on a
referendum open to all eligible voters, but:
[tihe Federalists' position was that a serious consideration of
the issues, where argument could be met by counterargument,
required citizens to meet together in preparation for a vote.
Because it would be impossible for the entire citizenry to meet
together, consideration by a representative body was the only
way the proposed new Constitution could receive a thoughtful
hearing.
As James Madison succinctly observed in Federalist 14, "[I1n a
[direct] democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in
person.... A democracy consequently, must be confined to a small
spot.
'2°
Madison himself considered direct democracy inherently risky.
2
'
For him, America's size was a blessing-an extended society required
representative democracy, thus avoiding the risks of popular
government. But in his abiding preference for representative
government, Madison was the exception. The more typical founding
view, with roots in the political philosophy of Rousseau,22 held the
Athenian model of pure democracy as the ideal form of government.
However, that model was considered workable only in a small society,
with a representative government necessary in a larger one."
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 13, at 33 (emphasis
added).
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 13, at 412.
18. JAMES F. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND
DEMOCRACY 26-50 (1995).
19. Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 13, at 100.
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 13, at 81 ("[A] pure
democracy... can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.").
22. See, e.g., Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSE (Cole. ed., 1950).
23. See FISHKIN, supra note 18, at 17-30; James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The
Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
287, 297-299 (1990).
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Modern society faces the challenge of adapting the Framers'
insights to a changing world.24 One profound change since the
founding is the shrinking of our country (and the world) by
technological advance-a development dramatically symbolized and
intensified by the internet. In 1787, discussions by the polity at large
were impossible. Two centuries later, people communicate
instantaneously with others around the globe.
Surely, the possibility of deliberation in a sizable country has
improved dramatically. The overwhelming advances in
communication and transportation call for reevaluation of whether a
more direct democracy could feature adequate deliberation.
In sum, the Framers' choice of representative democracy at the
federal level should not be wrenched from context. That choice
derived from a commitment to a deliberative ideal that could not be
achieved at the founding because of conditions that have
subsequently changed.
B. State Government-The "Republican" Misconception
The Constitution promises every state a "republican form of
government," which could be seen as evincing the Framers'
preference for representative over direct democracy. But the notion
that the Framers regarded a republican form of government as
inconsistent with direct democracy rests on a slender foundation-
primarily one passage in Federalist 10:
[a] republic, by which I mean a government in which the
scheme of representation takes place, opens a different
prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking ....
[A] great point [] of difference between a democracy and a
republic [is] the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a
small number of citizens elected by the rest.
2 5
Clearly, Madison here referred to a representative democracy as
a republic, and expressed a preference for this form of government.
Yet there is ample reason not to attach too much significance to this
brief passage.
First, Madison was not discussing the meaning of Article IV,
Section IV's guarantee of a "republican form of government" to the
states. When he and Hamilton did discuss this clause (in Federalist 21
24. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (noting judicial role in
"'discern[ing] how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew,
apply to the world we know."' (quoting Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring)).
25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 21, at 81-82.
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and 43), they made no reference to the language in Federalist 10, nor
in any way indicated that the clause prohibits direct democracy.26
Second, Madison signaled that he was using "republic" in a
nonobvious, perhaps idiosyncratic way: "[a] republic, by which I
mean .... " Just a few paragraphs earlier he referred to majority rule
as "the republican principle."27
In Federalist 14, Madison repeated his claim that republics, in
contrast to democracies, rely on a system of representation.28 But
elsewhere, he pursued a different theme. In Federalist 39 and 43, he
contrasted republicanism not with democracy, but with aristocracy
and monarchy.29 Perhaps more to the point, in Federalist 39 Madison
linked republican government with "the capacity of mankind for self-
government" where government derives "all its powers" from "the
great body of the people." ," In Federalist 55, he reiterated that
republican government presupposes "sufficient virtue among men for
self-government."31  Hamilton, for his part, explicitly equated
republican government with government "of the people.,
32
Indeed, Hamilton's Federalist 78 characterized the People's right
to change the Constitution as the "fundamental principle of
republican government."33  His Federalist 21 declared that Article
IV's "republican form of government" clause "could be no
impediment to reforms of State constitutions by a majority of the
people."3"
Hamilton was far from alone in linking republican government to
popular sovereignty and majority rule. Samuel Johnson's 1786
dictionary defined "republican" as "placing the government in the
people."35 In a Supreme Court opinion in 1793, Justice James Wilson,
one of just six men to sign both the Constitution and the Declaration
of Independence, defined "republican government" as one in which
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 21 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 13, at 139-40; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 13, at 274-78.
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 21, at 81.
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 20, at 100.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 13, at 240-41; THE
FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 26, at 274.
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 29, at 240-41.
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 13, at 346.
32. Id.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 13, at 469.
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 26, at 140.
35. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24 (1988).
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"the [S]upreme [P]ower resides in the body of the people."36 Two
years later, Justice James Iredell noted that in "a [R]epublic" the
"sovereignty resides in the great body of the people."37  So too,
Thomas Jefferson described majority rule as "the vital principle of
republics."38  Caleb Strong, a delegate at the Constitutional
Convention, noted that "in republics, the opinion of the majority
must prevail."39
Conceivably, all these references to self-government entailed
nothing more than citizens casting ballots to elect representatives.
However, the scraps in Federalist 10 and 14 merely establish
Madison's misgivings about direct democracy and his occasional use
of "republic" to denote representative democracy. They do not prove
that these misgivings and linguistic tendencies were shared by other
Framers, or were reflected in the "republican form of government"
clause.
The available evidence suggests neither. In the South Carolina
ratifying convention, Charles Pinckney, who had been a delegate to
the federal convention, described a republican government as one
where "the people at large, either collectively or by representation,"
form the legislature. ' At Pennsylvania's ratifying convention, James
Wilson equated a "republic" with a "democracy" (contrasting both to
a monarchy or aristocracy). In both, "the people at large retain the
supreme power, and act either collectively or by representation."'"
Wilson referred to representation itself as the "democratic
principle. ,42
In their many debates, the Framers regularly distinguished
republican government from monarchy and aristocracy, rarely from
democracy. Madison himself, who in Federalist 10 offered a
"republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican
government, 43 at the Philadelphia Convention described this
identical scheme as a defense against "the inconveniences of
36. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,457 (1793).
37. Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 93 (1795).
38. THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, in GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 189 (Hofstadter ed., 1958).
39. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 143 (1969)
40. 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (1881).
41. 2 id. at 433.
42. 2 id. at 482.
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 21.
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democracy consistent with the democratic form of Gov[ernmen]t.""
The political party he co-founded began as the Republican Party but
later became known as the Democratic Party.
The etymology of these two words supports their similarity.
"Republican" derives from the Latin res (thing) publica (public), a
rough equivalent of the Greek "demoskratia"-krasis (rule) demos
(by the people). Roger Sherman captured this etymological truth in a
letter to John Adams, noting that "what especially denominates [a
government] a republic is its dependence on the public or people at
large."45
Based on all of the available evidence, Article IV's guarantee of
a "republican form of government" cannot be said to reflect
opposition to direct democracy.4 It is fitting, then, that many states
have adopted direct democracy and our highest courts have given it
their imprimatur.47
C. Constitutional Amendment-Direct Democracy Indeed
What about the process of amending the Constitution? Can it be
denied that here the Framers' manifested their distrust of direct
democracy? Did they not make it impossible for the citizens
themselves to change the Constitution, requiring instead the heavy
cooperation and support of representatives? In fact, the Framers'
words and deeds yield the opposite conclusion.
Article V of the Constitution sets forth two procedures for
amending the Constitution:
44. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 135 (Farrand ed.,
1937).
45. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
24 (1972).
46. Even if "republican form of government" did indeed refer to a representative
government, the availability of citizen lawmaking need not compromise such a scheme.
All the states have representative governments, structured similarly to the federal
government. Citizen initiatives supplement this scheme of representation rather than
replace it. See Matthew Spitzer, Perspective on Direct Democracy: Evaluating Direct
Democracy: A Response, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDATABLE 37, 41 (1997) ("[W]hen we
speak of a system of 'direct democracy,' we are actually talking about a mixed system of
representation and direct democracy.").
47. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976)
(upholding constitutionality of city charter provision requiring approval by referendum of
certain laws passed by city council, and noting approvingly that direct democracy "give[s]
citizens a voice on questions of public policy") (quoting James v. Valtiera, 402 U.S. 137,
141 (1971)); Assoc. Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976)
(upholding amendment to state constitution providing for initiative, and calling the
amendment "one of the outstanding achievements of the progressive movement").
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[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or,
on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents
and Purposes, as Part of the Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress. 8
Clearly, Article V fails to provide the People with control of the
government. First, the Article V procedures do not empower a
majority: Two-thirds of both houses of Congress, or two-thirds of the
state legislatures, must initiate an amendment, and three-fourths of
the states must ratify it. Second, the Article V amendment process
lies in the hands of government officials, not the People. Congress,
on its own or spurred by state legislatures, must act before an
amendment even gets off the ground, and may dictate that ratification
take place by state legislatures rather than by the People at large.
Since Article V requires supermajority vote of government
officials, it does not promote direct democracy. But a close reading of
Article V reveals something interesting: It does not say that the
procedures it outlines are the only means of amending the
Constitution. A compelling case can be made that Article V merely
sets forth one means for amendment, and that there is also a separate
means: direct amendment by the People.
This conclusion receives support from the most relevant
precedent: the establishment of our Constitution. The Framers faced
a situation similar to that facing us today-they were stuck with a
document that seemed to defy ready amendment. Many states had
written constitutions in place in 1787. These constitutions established
demanding rules for amendment-just like our Article V. On the
surface, various state constitutions were violated when the federal
Constitution was adopted and ratified. The Constitution was
established in accordance with a process set forth in Article VII
(providing for ratification by special conventions of the People), a
process which seemingly contravened various state constitutions.
Taking note of all this, opponents of the proposed federal
Constitution declared that ratification under Article VII would be
illegal. However, they did not press the point, because supporters of
the Constitution had a knockout response. At the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia, a Maryland delegate cited a provision in
48. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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Maryland's Constitution governing its own amendment, and claimed
that Maryland was not free to pursue any other mode.49 James
Madison replied:
[t]he difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other
States. .... The people were in fact, the fountain of all power,
and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They
could alter constitutions as they pleased.... [F]irst principles
might be resorted to. 0
What were these "first principles"? That the People are
sovereign, and enjoy the inalienable right to change their
government. In the words of the Declaration of Independence: "[w]e
hold these truths to be self-evident.., that whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government.... "
Similar statements appear in the various state constitutions and Bills
or Declarations of Rights. 1
Thus, the ratification of the Constitution was lawful even in
states that did not follow provisions for amendment of their own
constitutions. Such provisions, read carefully, did not set forth the
only means of amendment. The adoption of the federal Constitution
effectively amended the state constitutions by direct appeal to the
People-a method understood as a "first principle" within all the
states.
If this is the case, the notion that Article V presents the only
means of amending the federal Constitution immediately becomes
suspect. Didn't the principle that governed adoption of the
Constitution itself-the right of the People to alter or abolish the
government-survive adoption of the Constitution? It may be
objected that this argument renders Article V a nullity. If the
Constitution can be amended by the People directly, why did the
Framers bother with the elaborate provisions of Article V? The
answer is that Article V authorizes a mode of amendment that would
have been otherwise unavailable. Absent explicit authority in the
Constitution, ordinary organs of government (Congress and state
legislatures) would not have been permitted to amend the
document."
49. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note
44, at 475.
50. Id. at 476.
51. See Amar, supra note 6, at 477-78 (citing and discussing provisions of various state
constitutions).
52. So understood, it makes good sense why the Framers made the Article V
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
But giving the organs of government the power to amend the
Constitution via Article V did not deprive the People themselves of
the independent right to amend the Constitution. Indeed, this right is
inalienable-it cannot be given up or waived-and was so recognized
as a first principle in the Declaration of Independence and at the
Constitutional Convention. The Federalist Papers also made several
references to this first principle. For example, Federalist 78 alluded
to "that fundamental principle of republican government which
admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the established
Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their
happiness."53
The argument for constitutional amendment directly by the
People receives support in the Constitution's text. The Preamble's
declaration that "We the People of the United States... do ordain
and establish this Constitution"54 embodies the principle of popular
sovereignty. If the People, acting by simple majority in each state,
had the authority to ordain and establish the Constitution, how could
they lack the authority to alter and abolish that Constitution by the
same means?55
The Framers recognized a connection between the Preamble and
the right of the People to alter or abolish the Constitution. James
Wilson, author of the first draft of the Preamble, observed that the
Constitution's "leading principle" is that "the supreme power resides
in the people,"56 and made clear that he saw this principle implied in
the Preamble. The Constitution, he observed:
opens with a solemn and practical recognition of that
principle:-"We the people of the United States, in order to
form a more perfect union, establish justice, &c., do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America." It
is announced in their name-it receives its political existence
from their authority: they ordain and establish. What is the
necessary consequence? Those who ordain and establish have
amendment process so cumbersome. Insofar as a major feature of the Constitution was its
restraint on government officials, it would have been self-defeating to permit such officials
to easily remove the restraints by amending them away.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 33, at 469.
54. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
55. As the Constitution merged previously separate states into one nation, the
relevant majority after ordainment and establishment became national, not the people
within each state. But while the Constitution redefined the relevant polity, it did nothing
to change the principle of popular sovereignty. To the contrary, the Preamble proudly
proclaims popular sovereignty as-literally-the Constitution's first principle.
56. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 40, at 434.
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the power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul.57
Wilson was not alone in connecting the Preamble to the right of
the People to alter or abolish the Constitution. Similar observations
were made by James Iredell (later a United States Supreme Court
Justice) at North Carolina's ratifying convention,58 and Edmund
Pendleton at Virginia's ratifying convention:
In the First Congress, James Madison proposed amending the
original Constitution by adding a prefix to the Preamble declaring
that "the people have an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible
right to reform or change their Government."" The proposal was
dropped only because it went without saying. For example, one
congressman opined that the unamended Preamble amounted to a
"practical recognition of the right of the people to ordain and
establish Governments."'" As the Framers recognized, it makes no
sense to think of such a right apart from the companion right to
reordain and reestablish the government.62
The Bill of Rights reinforces the point. The Ninth Amendment
announces that the "enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
People, 63 and the Tenth Amendment states that "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."'  Historical evidence suggests that the Preamble, the Ninth
Amendment, and Tenth Amendment all implicate the right of the
People to alter or abolish their government.65 Consider this proposed
57. Id. at 434-35.
58. Id. at 9, 230.
59. Id. at 37.
60. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
1026 (1971).
61. Id. at 1072 (remarks of James Jackson of Georgia).
62. The Preamble, of course, opened the original (that is, unamended) Constitution.
Article VII concluded it. These two provisions tie together neatly. While the Preamble
announces the People's action in establishing the Constitution, Article VII explains how
such action is taken. Thus, the Preamble and Article VII, in tandem, declared and
effected the right of the People to change their government through direct action. Article
VII makes no mention of clauses governing the amendment process in the state
constitutions, precisely because the Framers drew on a different method of amendment-
the direct appeal to the People signaled by the Preamble.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
65. Of course, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments may have additional meaning
beyond this core meaning.
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formulation that surfaced at Virginia's ratifying convention:
[t]he powers granted under the Constitution, being derived
from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them,
whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or
oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains
with them, and at their will; that, therefore, no right ... can be
canceled, abridged, restrained, or modified by [the federal
government] except in those instances in which power is given
by the Constitution for those purposes.6
This linkage of the Preamble with prototypes of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, and all three provisions to the right of the
People to change their government, was expressed at several other
ratifying conventions as well.67
Additional evidence linking the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
to the Preamble emerged during the First Congress, when a
representative proposed amending an early version of the Tenth
Amendment by adding as a prefix, "all powers being derived from the
people," because "he thought this a better place to make this
assertion than the introductory clause [the Preamble] of the
Constitution. ,68
Eventually, the identical point-that all power is derived from
the People-was made by the last three words of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, which spoke, respectively, of rights retained "by the
people" and reserved "to the people." These echo the Preamble's
affirmation that "We the People" have the right to establish (and
disestablish) a government.
The First Amendment also comes into play. It, too, refers to
"the people," specifically "the right of the people peaceably to
assemble., 69 At the time of the founding, "people," "assemble," and
''convention" were found clustered in discussions of popular
sovereignty." In 1789, the right of the People to assemble generally
referred to the right to assemble in convention.7 ' Thus, the First
Amendment helps protect the People's right to alter the Constitution,
by forbidding the government from preventing them from assembling
at a convention for that purpose.
One key clarification is in order. I have spoken throughout of
66. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 40, at 327.
67. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 6, at 492-93.
68. SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 1118.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70. See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 15.
71. Id. This was not the only meaning, of course.
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the right of the People to amend the Constitution. But what
constitutes the voice of the People-a majority? Two thirds?
Unanimous vote only? While the People retain the inalienable right
to amend the Constitution, what is the margin necessary to do so?
The answer seems obvious; in a regime where all citizens are
considered equal, only a majority could reflect the will of the People.
Nothing else treats all voters equally. The special status of majority
rule was clear to the Founders. As Thomas Jefferson wrote James
Madison in 1787: "It is my principle that the will of the Majority
should always prevail. If they approve the proposed [constitution] I
shall concur in it cheerfully, in the hopes that they [a majority] will
amend it whenever they shall find it work wrong."'72 Jefferson
considered majority rule "the fundamental law of every society of
equal rights."73
He was not alone. The distinguished judge and scholar Joseph
Story, writing about the Declaration of Independence's reference to
the right of the People to alter the government, parenthetically added
that the document "plainly intend[ed] the majority of the People" as
a proxy for the People.74 Gordon Wood's study of America's pre-
Constitution confederacy contains numerous contemporaneous
references to the right of the majority to alter a governing charter."
We also find references to majority rule during the Philadelphia
Convention of 1787, in The Federalist Papers, and at the state
ratifying conventions. For example, James Wilson noted that the
Constitution belongs to the People, who "have the right to mould, to
preserve, to improve, to refine, and to finish as they please. If so; can
it be doubted, that they have the right likewise to change it?"" To
remove any doubt, Wilson added that "[a] majority of society is
sufficient for this purpose.",
71
Even more conclusive than the Framers' words are their deeds.
Although Article VII did not specify that majority rule would apply
in each state's ratifying convention, this was universally understood.
There is no evidence of any opponent of the Constitution arguing that
72. THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 432 (Peterson ed., 1975).
73. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 89 (Ford ed., 1899) (1817 letter to Baron
F.H. Alexander von Humboldt).
74. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 330 (1833).
75. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
(1969).
76. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 304 (McCloskey ed., 1967).
77. Id.
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a supermajority should be required for ratification. In many states
ratification squeaked by:"8 why did none of the resourceful, zealous
opponents of ratification insist on a supermajority requirement?
Because majority rule literally went without saying."
In sum, Article V cannot be taken as evidence that the Framers
resisted directed democracy. To the contrary, the history of the
Constitution's adoption, and the text and structure of the document
itself, suggest the Framers' intention that the Constitution may be
amended by a majority of the People.
D. The Case of Mr. Madison
Despite all of the above, some may point to Federalist 10 as
evidence of the Framers' distrust of direct democracy. It is, after all,
written by the anointed father of the Constitution, and does express
serious misgivings about direct democracy. For several reasons,
however, one must be careful about enlisting Madison as an opponent
of direct democracy-even beyond the fact that he appealed to direct
democracy to justify adoption of the Constitution.
Madison's views are not limited to Federalist 10. In Federalist
53, he observed the "great importance in a republic not only to guard
against the oppression of the rulers, but to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other.""0  Legal scholars have
focused almost exclusively on Madison's second issue (protection of
minority from majority), while ignoring his first (protection of the
78. See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 17.
79. Because Article VII required ratification by nine of the thirteen states, one might
be tempted to see nine/thirteenths, rather than majority rule, as the relevant requirement.
That would be a mistake. As Article VII makes clear, any states that did not ratify the
Constitution would not be forced into the Union-the nine/thirteenths requirement had
no binding effect on them. The nine states needed for ratification simply represented a
term in the new contract, based on what the Framers regarded as necessary for a feasible
union. They may have had good reason for choosing the number nine, but it has no
significance as a matter of principle-they could just as easily have chosen eight or ten.
The same could not be said for the requirement that ratification in each state required
majority approval. As noted, the assumption of simple majority vote to determine
ratification was so universally shared that, even absent mention in Article VII, no one
questioned it.
To be sure, the Constitution requires supermajorities for certain actions: ratification of
treaties, convictions of impeachment, overridings of presidential vetoes, and constitutional
amendments pursuant to Article V. However, these involve acts by government entities
exercising powers delegated to them by the People. There is no hint in the Constitution,
or elsewhere, that the People wished to delegate away their right to amend the
Constitution (which is, in any event, inalienable and thus cannot be delegated away). That
right was understood to reside with a simple majority.
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 53 (James Madison), supra note 13, at 323.
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People against self-interested government). In fact, Madison, along
with other Framers, was deeply concerned about governmental self-
dealing.
To minimize this risk, he helped design an elaborate edifice. On
the most familiar level, he divided the federal government into three
branches that would check and balance one another. The
Constitution further split Congress into two branches, and divided
power between competing governments-state and federal. Equally
important, if less recognized, the Constitution gives ordinary citizens
direct power to restrain all branches of government. Specifically, it
empowers the People to elect their representatives, and to serve on
juries and grand juries and in the militia.8'
Jury and militia service have proven more limited than was
envisioned, 2  and voting for representatives alone is clearly
inadequate to safeguard against self-dealing government.83 If James
Madison were alive today, he would have to balance his misgivings
about direct democracy against the value of direct democracy in
restraining representatives.
In Federalist 10, Madison did opine that representative
democracy diminishes the risk of tyranny of the majority. ' However,
his broad concern was tyranny of any faction, which he defined as "a
number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole."85 As it happens, he thought that minority factions posed
little risk, because the majority "can defeat its sinister views by
regular vote." 6 But note that Madison did not envision a nation in
which an extreme imbalance of wealth mocked the notion of equality
81. See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 6, at xiii-xv (discussing interaction among these
powers, and their role in restraining government). The significance of the jury and militia
in the constitutional scheme is discussed in more detail infra text accompanying notes 128-
43.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 148-51.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35. The congressional pay raise of 1991
provides an illustration. The public overwhelmingly opposed the raise and, in theory,
voters could have thrown out members of Congress at the next election. But Congress
contrived various means to protect itself (e.g., avoiding a "yes/no" vote that would put
each member on the record, and the two parties reaching an agreement not to endorse any
candidate who made the pay raise a campaign issue). Moreover, as noted, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 14, the seniority system in Congress gives voters a strong
disincentive to remove their representative.
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 21, at 81-84.
85. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 80.
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at the ballot box.' While Bill Gates and a homeless man receive the
same vote, and General Motors and the mom-and-pop grocery store
are each free to make campaign contributions, formal equality
provides no guarantee that a majority can protect itself through its
representatives. Close observers of the political scene confirm the
obvious: on many issues, a powerful minority controls policy.' One
way to ameliorate this problem is greater resort to direct democracy.89
In short, James Madison's fear of direct democracy should not be
wrenched from context, nor applied unthinkingly to a very different
context two centuries later. He also expressed fear of self-dealing
government, and tyranny by factions-including minority factions.
Insofar as representative government has not prevented self-dealing
government and a kind of minority tyranny, we should not lightly
invoke Madison as an opponent of direct democracy. Direct
democracy may be a partial solution to problems Madison deemed
fundamental.
In sum, the notion that the Framers opposed direct democracy
does not hold up. They established representative government at the
federal level because America was too large for anything else. They
guaranteed states a "republican form of government," but did not
regard this commitment as preventing states from utilizing direct
democracy. While they established a cumbersome means for
government officials to amend the Constitution, they recognized that
the People themselves retain the right to amend the Constitution
directly. James Madison embraced the right of the People to control
their government, and the misgivings he expressed about direct
democracy are inconclusive when seen in the context of his larger
goals and developments in contemporary society.
87. To be sure, there was an enormous imbalance between the haves and have-nots in
1787. However, because the polity disenfranchised have-nots (virtually all blacks, and
anyone who could not afford a poll tax), there was greater equality among voters than
there is today.
88. See generally ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS
(1999).
89. Of course, even in a direct democracy, imbalance of wealth can create imbalance
of power. See infra text accompanying notes 246-49.
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II. Direct Democracy-Arguments and Experience
A. Defending Initiatives Against the Bogeymen"
Public opinion polls show that most Americans favor the
availability of direct lawmaking. 1  Many states have in fact
established and increasingly use citizen "initiatives" whereby the
People at large directly pass laws or even amend their constitutions, 9,
rather than rely exclusively on their elected representatives. 9
On its face, the citizen initiative seems to embody democracy in
action.94 But even as this popular method of lawmaking spreads, so
does opposition to it. A chorus of legal scholars assails direct
democracy, citing two primary (related) concerns: (i) that it will
tyrannize minorities,' and (ii) that it will produce short-sighted,
selfish legislation rather than public-spirited deliberation. 96
90. See Jeremy Waldron, Reading Your Rights, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW 20, Mar.
8, 1998 (noting the "bogeymen with which populism is often discredited").
91. For example, a 1992 poll by the Gordan Black Corporation found that 92% of
registered voters nationwide favor the availability of initiatives in their state. (This and
other polling data were provided to the author by the Roper Center at the University of
Connecticut.) See also CRONIN, supra note 15, at 78-79. In addition, polling data
provided by the Roper Center shows that a substantial majority of Americans favor
national direct democracy. For example, a 1993 poll of national adults conducted by the
Los Angeles Times found that 65% favored a system of national referenda.
92. Presently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia provide for citizen
lawmaking. Of these, fifteen authorize initiatives for both statutes and constitutional
amendment, whereas six plus the District of Columbia permit initiatives for statute only
and three permit initiatives for constitutional amendment only.
93. While the precise form of initiatives varies from state to state, they generally take
one of two basic forms: "direct initiative" and "indirect initiative." Under direct initiative,
if private citizens present a sufficient number of signatures in support of a particular bill, it
must be placed on a ballot for consideration by the electorate at a future date. Under
indirect initiative, the measure first requires some action by the legislature. Presently
fourteen states and the District of Columbia permit only direct initiative, five use only
indirect initiative, three use indirect initiative for statutes and direct initiative for
constitutional amendment, and two use both direct and indirect initiative for statutes.
94. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (emergence of the initiative
reflects Americans' "devotion to democracy").
95. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, Perspective on Direct Democracy: The People: The
Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 13 (1997) ("[D]irect
democracy... invites majoritarian tyranny."); Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal
Protection And The Problem With Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 581 (1994)
("[W]ith regards to the peril of majoritarian tyranny, plebiscites are supposedly worse
than legislatures."); Cynthia Fountaine, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability
and Constitutionality Of Legislating By Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 750 (1988)
(casually referring to the "majority tyranny that results from direct democracy").
96. See, e.g., Sherman Clark, Tales of Popular Sovereignty: Direct Democracy in
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Does direct democracy leave minorities-including racial
minorities, but also homosexuals, aliens, and other underrepresented
groups-at the mercy of majorities? The risk that citizen lawmaking
will be (mis)used to punish the weakest or least popular members of a
community rests on a vision of an atomized populace voting its fears,
prejudices, and unenlightened self-interests. 9  To the extent this
phenomenon exists, we should not regard it as unalterable. If the
citizenry lacks civic virtue, that may be because it has been alienated
from civic responsibility. Involving people in the process of making
laws is a step in the direction of fostering public-spiritedness. By
contrast, allowing people to vote only for representatives, who often
duck hard choices and place their own ambitions ahead of public
service, is a prescription for a selfish and apathetic citizenry. To the
extent that initiatives inspire citizens to participate in collective self-
government, they could prove a partial corrective.98
Certainly voters will, on occasion, fail to respect the rights of
their fellow citizens. However, as we shall see, this occurs
infrequently" and, when it does, various structural safeguards are
available. " '
Beyond the specific fear of oppression, critics of direct
democracy argue that initiatives will inevitably yield legislation
without reflection, and the triumph of self-interest over the public
good. This notion reflects an unjustified faith in legislatures and
debasement of the public. Legal scholar Lynn Baker (among others)
has argued at length that the average initiative voter is no less likely
than the average legislator to vote in a thoughtful and public-spirited
America, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1560, 1573 (1998) (Initiatives result in "poor or short-sighted
decisionmaking".); Hamilton, supra note 95, at 15 ("The individual [initiative voter]
typically asks only, 'What's in it for me?'... Direct democracy, or the public initiative,
lends itself to misguided yes/no votes, not to the scrutiny, [and] deliberation... necessary
to solve hard social problems.").
97. Before assuming the worst about ordinary citizens, we should reflect that the
citizenry's capacity for self-government underlies our nation's experiment with democracy.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, supra note 31, at 346 ("As there is a degree of depravity in
mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other
qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.
Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree
than any other form.").
98. Thus a rare politician to endorse national initiative said: "I feel as strongly as I do
about this reform because I believe it goes to the heart of our national malaise." JACK
KEMP, AN AMERICAN RENAISSANCE: A STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s 190 (1979).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 109-12.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 113-18.
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manner.
°1
Legislatures do not always conform to the civics class model.
One California legislator titled his memoirs, What Makes You Think
We Read the Bills?102 His book clarified what students of state
legislatures already knew-representatives often don't read the bills
they vote on, nor listen to debate. Instead, they respond to their party
leaders or major campaign contributors. 3 Indeed, the initiative arose
out of the Populist and Progressive movements at the turn of this
century, in response to the control that party bosses and political
machines, themselves enmeshed with corporate interests, had
attained over the political process."°
No one argues that initiatives always work better than the
ordinary legislative process, or that states should abandon lawmaking
by legislatures in favor of lawmaking by initiative. Indirect
lawmaking has major advantages, especially the benefit of
specialization of labor. The legislature can set up committees, gather
information, and develop expertise. There is much to be said for a
system of government in which a relatively small number of citizens
stand in for the polity as a whole in conducting day to day affairs.
But we don't confront an either/or proposition. We can benefit
from the advantages of a representative system, subject to the
availability of initiatives when citizens find representation inadequate.
As Woodrow Wilson said, direct democracy is intended "to restore,
not destroy, representative government."'0'5 Even when they fail to
produce laws, initiatives may put issues on the agenda that otherwise
suffer neglect from politicians. Many landmark reforms, eventually
enacted by national legislation or constitutional amendment,
originated as initiatives in the states: women's suffrage, and abolition
of poll taxes, among others.'
Opponents of direct democracy trot out examples of initiatives
too complicated for voters to understand, or campaigns dominated by
101. See Lynn Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice
Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 707 (1991).
102. H. RICHARDSON, WHAT MAKES You THINK WE READ THE BILLS? (1978).
103. See Spitzer, supra note 46, at 39 ("[I]f the legislators read anything, it is the
summary of the bill prepared by the relevant committee. More often, however, the
legislators do not even read the summary.").
104. DAVID SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE
REVOLUTION 5-10 (1989).
105. 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 287-88 (Baker & Dodd, eds.,
1925).
106. Baker, supra note 101, at 754.
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well-mobilized interest groups. But flaws in direct democracy
constitute grounds for reform, not abolition. If the initiative process
does not always conform to the ideal, we should try to fix it rather
than abandon it. If perfection were required, we would have to throw
out legislatures too.
Moreover, concern that initiatives lack proper deliberation
suggests an opportunity as much as a risk. Assorted measures can be
taken to ensure that voters possess more familiarity with issues.' 7
The appropriate model of direct democracy is not a simple vote in a
private booth, but a process that brings citizens together to discuss an
issue. This, in turn, contributes to a more deliberative and
community-minded citizenry. In other words, we should turn on its
head the argument that direct democracy produces laws uninformed
by deliberation. Initiatives should be used to inspire deliberation,
producing both better laws and better citizens.
B. How Are we Doing?: The Experience with Direct Democracy
We need not theorize in a vacuum: We can draw on almost a full
century of experimentation with direct democracy. However,
students of the states' experiences with initiatives reach very different
conclusions. While few maintain that the initiative has lived up to the
hopes of its early champions, some argue that it has been primarily
positive-enhancing participation and, on balance, producing
beneficial legislation. Others insist that the experience has been
primarily negative.0 8
But some things emerge with reasonable clarity from perusal of
all the studies and the raw data (the votes on initiatives themselves)..
First and foremost, concern about majority tyranny has proven
largely unsubstantiated. Back in 1939, highly-respected political
scientist V.O. Key coauthored an analysis of California's initiative
experience, and concluded that "[t]he initiative has not brought about
the enactment of legislation seriously detrimental to property rights
or tyrannical toward minority interests, as was feared by its
opponents."'" Four decades later, surveying the situation nationwide,
a commentator observed that "the history of the initiative is
107. See infra text accompanying notes 201-43,
108. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES,
OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 18-26 (1998) (summarizing studies).
109. V.O. KEY JR. & WINSTON CROUCH, THE INTIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN
CALIFORNIA 442 (1939).
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remarkably free of the enactment of abusive legislation."
°0
Indeed, a tiny percentage of proposed initiatives are aimed at
restricting civil rights, and most of these are defeated."' Citizens have
used direct democracy less to oppress vulnerable minorities than to
(i) reform government processes through campaign finance laws,
restrictions on lobbying, and conflict of interest statutes, (ii) restrict
their tax burden, and (iii) protect the environment."'
To be sure, initiatives can result in what might be characterized
as majority tyranny."' To take one prominent illustration, in 1992
Colorado voters amended the state Constitution to ban anti-
discrimination laws protecting homosexuals."' But that episode
actually illustrates why fear of majority tyranny via initiative is
exaggerated: The measure was held unconstitutional by the Colorado
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court."5 Laws
enacted by the People through initiatives, like laws enacted by state
legislatures, are subject to judicial review.
There are other safeguards as well. Under the United States
Constitution, federal laws take precedence over state laws with which
they conflict."6 Thus, for example, were Congress to enact a law
banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the
discriminatory practices of many states would be overridden."7
Another safeguard is the freedom to vote with one's feet. Gay men
and lesbians in Colorado, like citizens of every other state, can
migrate to a more congenial locale. '8
110. Ronald Allen, The National Initiative Proposal: A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB.
L. REV. 965, 1021 (1978).
111. See CRONIN, supra note 15, at 92.
112. See SCHMIDT, supra note 104, at 287-94 (listing initiatives passed in each state
from 1970-1986).
113. Of course, we should not lose sight of the fact that Madison's ingenious
arrangement for preventing legislatures from producing majority tyranny has itself often
fallen well short of the mark. Slavery and Jim Crow are prominent examples.
114. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30 cl. b.
115. Romer v. Evans, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affd, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
116. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
117. It should be noted that the anti-gay Colorado initiative notwithstanding,
homosexuals have suffered far more at the hands of legislators than at the hands of the
people. The legislatures of many states, not the People, have criminalized gay sex. In
contrast, the people of California and Oregon have rejected anti-gay initiatives by large
margins.
118. While this option is obviously not always practical, the availability of a safe haven
for oppressed groups can be a godsend. It would have been infinitely preferable for blacks
to have enjoyed equal rights everywhere, but the fact that many southern blacks moved
north, where they could vote and enjoy other rights, both eased their plight and helped
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The track record suggests that citizen lawmaking not only avoids
majority tyranny, but serves no particular ideological agenda."9
Initiatives have enacted the death penalty, usually thought of as a
conservative position, and have de-criminalized marijuana, usually
thought of as liberal. They have been used to enact anti-smoking
measures and many other laws which fall into neither category. 121 In
general, the substantive outcomes produced by initiatives should give
little concern about their continuance or expansion. Naturally one
will oppose this or that outcome, just as no one is pleased with every
result produced by every legislature. The historical record in no way
suggests that citizen lawmaking will, as a general matter, produce
particularly undesirable or dangerous legislation.
12
On the other hand, experience suggests that pessimism about the
initiative process has proven justified. Most students of initiative
conclude that campaigns are frequently dominated by money,'122 and
generally lack reasoned debate and deliberation.
123
Before we overreact to the shortcomings of the initiative process,
we should note that these flaws often mar the representative process
as well. Insofar as initiatives give citizens more control of their lives
and government,24 and have not proven a vehicle of majority tyranny
launch the modern civil rights movement. Our country was founded by people fleeing
religious oppression. As long as any forms of oppression exist within our own borders, it
is salutary that we have many mini-polities within those borders, and free movement
among them.
119. See SCHMIDT, supra note 104, at 37 ("In 1977-1986 liberal, environmentalist, or
left-leaning groups secured ballot placement for 96 state-level Initiatives, and voters
approved 43 of them. During that same period, conservative-oriented groups put 91
Initiatives on state ballots, and voters approved 41 of them.").
120. In part because initiatives have not produced predictably liberal or conservative
results, but have helped keep elected officials from feathering their own nests and
corrupting the political process, one finds prominent supporters of direct democracy
spanning the political spectrum: from Ralph Nader on the left, to Ross Perot in the center,
and Jack Kemp on the right.
121. Nor is it the case that citizens pass laws promiscuously. Few states average more
than a handful of initiatives per year, and a majority of initiatives are defeated. See
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 108, at 30-32.
122. See, e.g., BRODER, supra note 4, at 163 (Money "is almost always a major--even
dominant-factor" in initiative campaigns.); Richard Collins & Dale Oesterle, Governing
by Initiative: Structuring the Initiative Ballot: Procedures that Do and Don't Work, 66
COLO. L. REV. 47, 56 (1995) ("[I]t is generally agreed that money is at least as important
in initiative campaigns as in elections.").
123. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 108.
124. One commentator denies that direct democracy is more democratic than
representative democracy. See Sherman Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy,
112 HARv. L. REV. 434 (1998). Clark argues that direct democracy fails to account for the
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or otherwise produced disaster, flaws in the initiative process seem to
be grounds for reforming rather than rejecting the process.25
III. Initiative as a Means to Civic Maturation
Even if the case for direct democracy has bested the case against,
the defense should not rest. Arguably the strongest argument in
favor of direct democracy has not really been made (or at least not
made as sharply and explicitly as it needs to be). Initiative is an
important means of achieving the civic maturation of Americans
individually and of our polity collectively.
One oft-stated goal of democracy is the growth of individuals.26
Hence, the double meaning of "self-government": in the course of
participating in public affairs, individuals become more complete
people (or "selves") with richer lives.2 The converse is equally true:
if self-government promotes better, more mature selves, so too the
latter makes effective self-government possible.' Unless citizens
develop sufficient knowledge, independence, and public-spiritedness,
intensity of preferences. First, because of the lack of legislative tools like logrolling and
filibuster, initiatives "fail to take into account that, for any particular issue, some
individuals will care more-have more at stake-than will others." Id. at 450. This claim
strikes me as weak. Those who feel intensely about an issue invest more energy and
resources in the initiative campaign, and therefore exercise a disproportionate impact.
Clark also observes that each voter cares more intensely about some issues than others.
Since initiatives are voted on singly, not as part of a package resulting from a process
involving horse-trading and compromise, a voter's preference is expressed in a vacuum.
As a result "[a] majority of citizens, though in favor of Proposition A in the abstract, might
actually prefer a world in which Proposition A is defeated, if sacrificing that outcome
would allow them to secure preferred outcomes on other issues about which they are more
intensely concerned." Id. at 451. Even if representative government better expresses the
overall priorities of some people, that hardly makes it more democratic. It would be more
democratic only if most people would willingly forfeit a vote on issues in the belief that
representative government comes closer to achieving their optimal overall outcome.
Many people have an intense preference for direct democracy. Thus their optimal
outcome includes the ability to vote directly on many issues, even if that doesn't produce
the substantive results they most prefer. Certainly dissatisfaction with results has not
produced a significant movement to repeal the initiative in the states which have it.
125. See Spitzer, supra note 46, at 38 (criticizing opponents of direct democracy for
comparing the "aspirational ideals" of representative democracy with the real-world
shortcomings of the initiative process).
126. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 38-40 (1859).
127. See 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 76, at 403 (noting in self-
government the "powerful tendency to open, to enlighten, to enlarge, and to exalt [the]
mind").
128. No one was more sensitive to this point than Thomas Jefferson. See JEAN
YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE CHARACTER OF A
FREE PEOPLE 102-52 (1998).
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they cannot handle the responsibilities of self-government. Thus,
when the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc dissolved, observers
widely wondered whether the people of the newly-freed countries
had the wherewithal to sustain democratic government.'29 These
people, after all, had no experience with the blessings and burdens of
freedom.
While a certain trust in ordinary people undergirded America's
experiment with democracy,""' whether the citizenry would prove
worthy of that trust remained an open question.'3' The Founders
believed the experiment necessary because non-democratic
government was inherently undesirable. They knew both from
political theory and painful personal experience with Great Britain
that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. They
drafted a Constitution that gives the people at large a crucial role in
safeguarding against power-hungry and despotic government. 1
2
Even if the citizenry did nothing but elect representatives, an
able citizenry would be critical. If people are apathetic, they will not
vote. If they are corrupt, they will be bribed. If they are ill-informed,
they will be swayed by demagoguery or sophistry. If they are fearful
or obsequious, they will be bullied. And if they are selfish, they will
vote only for their own interests and never the public interest.'33
Accordingly, an educated, engaged, and public-spirited citizenry
is always valuable. It is particularly valuable, indeed indispensable,
when the People are entrusted with more than the vote. The Framers
recognized that the vote would not be enough to restrain government
officials. Accordingly, the Constitution also gives the People, in their
respective roles as jurors and militia members, crucial responsibility
for administering justice and protecting national security."' The jury
and the militia were essential institutions to the Framers-they
129. See, e.g., Gaddis Smith, Building a Democracy; Is this a Russian Government, Or
Just a Fight Between a 'Donkey'and a 'Fool,'? L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, at 1.
130. See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, supra note 31.
131. This belief is nicely captured by Benjamin Franklin's famous remark after the
Constitutional Convention. Asked by a woman what form of government the Framers
had come up with, he replied, "[a] Republic, if you can keep it." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 85.
132. The traditional story emphasizes how the Framers sought to restrain power by
dividing it among governmental entities. Less noted, but equally important, the Framers
gave ordinary citizens direct means of restraining government officials. See AMAR &
HIRSCH, supra note 6, at ix-xxi.
133. See id. at 186-87.
134. See id. at xiii-xv. 51-58. 129-134.
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played a prominent role in the original Constitution, and an even
more central role in the Bill of Rights.'35
These institutions safeguarded against tyranny. As jurors, and
grand jurors, the People would deter and punish government
oppression or corruption. As militia members, they would thwart
foreign invasion or domestic siege. The militia and jury were both
local bodies composed of ordinary citizens working together to carry
out collective governmental responsibilities. They represented twin
duties of citizenship and, for the most part, those eligible to serve on
one (adult white males) were eligible to serve on the other."'
However, it was impossible for the jury and militia to perform
their roles adequately unless their members were of sound and
independent judgment, probity, and courage, as well as educated in
public affairs and committed to the well-being of the community and
nation.'37 How were they to attain these traits? By service in the jury
and militia! These institutions were valued as forums for educating
the citizenry in the skills and knowledge necessary for self-
government more broadly. In other words, the jury and militia not
only required, but also provided, the civic maturation needed for a
thriving (or even just surviving) democracy.'38
This was keenly understood by Alexis de Tocqueville, who
characterized the jury as a "public school ever open, in which every
135. So too, because the Constitution guarantees to every state a "republican form of
government," citizens will also assume various responsibilities at the state and local level
that are of paramount importance-for example, serving on boards of education. Cf.
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 613 (1970)
("Ultimately any system of freedom of expression depends upon the existence of an
educated, independent, mature citizenry.").
136. Both the militia and jury reflected suspicion of paid, professional officials-a
central standing army on the one hand, and judges, prosecutors, and bureaucrats on the
other. These roles, and various implications of them, are discussed at length in AMAR &
HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 51-182.
137. The notion that a virtuous citizenry is indispensable to the nation's republican
aspirations was commonplace at the time. See ROBERT HUGHES, AMERICAN VISIONS
108 (1997) (This notion was "shared by all literate citizens of the new Republic, in the
wake of the Revolution."); Richard Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and
Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 155 (1987) ("[C]ivic virtue surely
was an important concern in political theory both before and during the framing of our
constitution.").
138. This point has been incisively developed by a few constitutional scholars: Vikram
Amar (in the case of the jury) and David Williams (in the case of the militia). See Vikram
Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203
(1995); David Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE. L.J. 551 (1991).
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juror learns to exercise his rights" '139 and added: "I do not know
whether the jury is useful to those who are in litigation; but I am
certain it is highly beneficial for [the jurors] .... [It is] one of the
most efficacious means for the education of the people which society
can employ."'40  Indeed, the jurors' education involved an almost
formal quality: "judges often seized the occasion to educate the jurors
about legal and political values ranging well beyond the narrow issues
before them.' 41  Trials would sometimes produce "an open and
public discussion of all causes... [which is] the means by which the
people are let into the knowledge of public affairs."
4 2
The education jurors received transcended the knowledge they
acquired. As Akhil Amar put it, "[t]hrough the jury, citizens would
learn self-government by doing self-government.',13 De Tocqueville
explained that jury service instills the spirit and habits of the judicial
mind into every citizen, providing "the soundest preparation for free
institutions."44
Jury service provided not only knowledge and skills conducive to
effective citizenship, but also the necessary commitment. Again, de
Tocqueville captures the point. Jury service, he said
makes all men feel the duties which they are bound to discharge
toward society, and the part which they take in the
Government. By obliging men to turn their attention to affairs
which are not exclusively their own it rubs off that individual
egotism which is the rust of society.i 
sn
Because of all that jury service gave to jurors (knowledge, skills,
commitment), de Tocqueville declared the jury "the most efficacious
means of teaching [the people] to rule well.' 146
The militia, too, was expected to create superior citizens. As
David Williams observed, militia service could be burdensome, and
the militiaman "was expected to bear these burdens with the
139. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 181 (Commager ed.,
Reeve trans., 1946).
140. Id. at 181-82.
141. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SuP. CT.
REV. 127 (1967).
142. Letters From The Federal Farmer (XV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 315, 320 (Storing ed., 1981).
143. Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE. L.J. 1131, 1187
(1991).
144. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 139, at 181.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 182.
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knowledge that he was keeping the Republic safe. The experience of
working with fellow citizens could cement this perspective of self-
sacrifice to the common good."'47 Because the militia was expected to
protect against not only foreign foes, but also the federal government
if the latter proved oppressive, militiamen would have to determine if
the federal government overstepped its authority. Accordingly,
militia service "served to engender virtue by inducing the experience
of independent self-government." '148 Militia service would create
more active and independent citizens, committed to the public good
but confident in their right to disagree with the government.
Both jury service and militia service, then, conferred on ordinary
people crucial specific powers (with respect to the administration of
justice and national security), and enhanced their capacity as citizens
generally. This was a crucial part of the vibrant democratic-
republican vision underlying the Constitution.
But it would be folly to pretend that this vision endures in
contemporary America. In 1787, America was a comparatively tiny
country with a constricted notion of citizenship-white males only.
Two centuries later, both our population and our definition of
citizenship have expanded enormously. As a result, jury service is
something people experience rarely, and usually for a very brief
period 4 9 Moreover, the jury has come to be regarded as much as a
nuisance to be avoided as a shining badge of citizenship.' Under the
circumstances, it hardly plays a major role in inculcating commitment
to and skill in self-government.
The militia even less so. The citizen-army envisioned by the
Framers has all but disappeared: it survives, as a shell of its
constitutional self, in the state national guards, where only a
minuscule percentage of America citizens serve."'
147. Williams, supra note 138, at 580.
148. Id.
149. This was not always the case. See, e.g., RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 352 (During winter of
1920-21, forty jurors--seeking income during a recession-served six two-week terms
each.).
150. See, e.g., Taylor, Want to Duck Jury Duty? They've Heard Them All, NAT'L L. J.
Nov. 27, 1995, at A-24; Andrea Gerlin, Jury-Duty Scofflaws Try Patience of Courts, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1995, at B1. To be sure, there is evidence that from the beginning many
Americans sought to escape jury service. See Nancy King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal
Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673 (1996).
151. For a full discussion of the evolution of the militia, see Alan Hirsch, The Militia
Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 919 (1988).
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In short, the means envisioned by the Framers for developing a
citizenry necessary for thriving self-government are no longer
available. But it does not follow that we must abandon concern for
civic virtue and maturation. Rather, we must look in different places.
Thus, after lamenting the militia's demise, David Williams urges that
we find other means to promote "direct control by the people of their
own government ' or at least "giv[e] the people a direct hand in
their government." '53
In seeking to recapture the founding vision, Williams is not
alone. In recent years a cadre of prominent legal scholars, sometimes
referred to as "New Republicans," '54 has bemoaned the distancing of
American citizens from self-government and the decline of
deliberative public-spirited democracy. Legal scholars Bruce
Ackerman, Cass Sunstein, and Frank Michelman, among others, have
offered various prescriptions for reconnecting the People with their
government.'55
The New Republicans emphasize that citizens are not atomized
individuals: they are part of an organic society whose claims must
sometimes take precedence over their own interests.'56 This result
must occur "through deliberative debate and the unforced agreement
flowing from it."'57 A more virtuous, mature citizenry is both cause
and effect of these other values. That is, a deliberative, public-
spirited polity requires a virtuous citizenry, and the process of public-
spirited deliberation reinforces and enhances a polity's civic virtue.
As Richard Epstein observed, "[c]losely akin to civic virtue ... is
the idea of extensive general 'participation' in public government by
individuals drawn from all orders of society.'.. 8  As noted, in this
regard the Framers' vision, while inspiring, was also cramped. The
Framers excluded women and non-whites from political participation,
and expected office-holding, jury service, and political involvement
152. Williams, supra note 138, at 612.
153. Id. at 613.
154. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 26 (1994).
155. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1502 (1988); Cass
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1985); Bruce Ackerman,
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
156. See KRONMAN, supra note 154, at 26 (New Republicans believe society must seek
to satisfy not an aggregate of individual interests, but rather "the best among competing
interpretations of the public good.").
157. Id.
158. Richard Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional
Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 155-56 (1987).
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generally to be the enclave of the propertied class.9 By contrast,
"[t]he new republicans have repudiated the elitist tradition of
republican thought and propose a republican vision that includes
direct participation by all citizens.""
An idea is in the air. Akhil Amar and Vikram Amar celebrate
the republican function of the jury; David Williams laments the
demise of the militia and seeks ways to replace its democratic culture;
the New Republicans call for a more public-spirited discourse. One
vision predominates: political participation producing a superior
republic, with the citizenry and polity maturing in tandem. 6' Closing
the gap between this luminous ideal and the dark reality of today's
democracy presents a great challenge. How can the People cultivate
their capacity as citizens and create a thriving polity, one that lives up
to the name and promise of self-government?
One obvious potential solution has received surprisingly short
shrift. Recall that Williams beckons us to a future in which
Americans have "direct control" of and a more "direct hand" in
government. He proposes a reconstituted militia, universal public
service, and various campaign reforms designed to enhance the voice
of ordinary citizens.' Yet he ignores the most direct participatory
avenue: voter initiative." So, too, Frank Michelman advocates a
republican politics conceived of as a "process in which private-
159. In addition, not all the Founders held out much hope for a virtuous citizenry.
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REV. 543,556-60 (1986).
160. Dorothy Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 587, 648 (1993). To be sure, the founding republicanism and neo-republicanism
each have strands of both elitism and populism. See Pope, supra note 23, at 303.
161. More generally, the importance of developing a virtuous citizenry has become
widely recognized. See YARBROUGH, supra note 128, at xvii:
"[T]he big news in the nineties was that the concern for virtue was everywhere .... When
William J. Bennett's BOOK OF VIRTUES appeared in 1993, it immediately soared to the
top of the best-seller lists, and stayed there. A year later, Newsweek's cover story was
'The Politics of Virtue'.... [Political theorists] set to work at developing a composite of
the virtues appropriate to a modern liberal republic .... [Tihese theorists often relied on
the findings of public policy analysts, who themselves, after a silence of several decades,
were rediscovering the importance of character and virtue for the health of the polity."
162. See Williams, supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
163. See id.
164. See Pope, supra note 23, at 294 (noting tendency of New Republicans to embrace
"elitist solutions"). Professor Ackerman is a partial exception. See BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 414-16 (1998) (proposing "Popular Sovereignty
Initiative," authorizing constitutional amendment when a second-term President submits a
proposed amendment that is approved by two-thirds vote in Congress and by voters at the
next two presidential elections).
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regarding 'men' become public-regarding citizens and thus members
of a people." '65 In his vision, "citizenship-participation as an equal
in public affairs, in pursuit of a common good-appears as a primary,
indeed constitutive, interest of the person."'66 Michelman envisions
this process of public spirited participation in "town meetings and
local government agencies; civic and voluntary organizations; social
and recreational clubs; schools public and private; managements,
directorates and leadership groups of organizations of all kinds;
workplaces and shop floors; public events and street life; and so
on.', 67 And so on? His litany seems to include every conceivable
means of citizen participation except lawmaking.
6 1
It is time to consider whether exercise of their sovereign power
to make laws could help the People mature into full-fledged citizens,
and help produce a more mature polity in every respect. Today, we
are forfeiting one of the major virtues of self-government as
165. Michelman, supra note 155, at 1502.
166. Id. at 1503.
167. Id. at 1531.
168. In a subsequent piece, Michelman explicitly rejected direct democracy. Frank
Michelman, "Protecting the People from Themselves," or How Direct Can Democracy Be?
45 UCLA L. REV. 1717 (1998). He observed:
[T]here are some decisions, among them some of the most important that will ever face
any political community, that cannot conceivably be made by a fair majority vote, because
they are decisions about exactly what a fair majority vote ... properly means ....
Democracy thus defined cannot conceptually deliver the answers we need.
Id. at 1729, 1730. This argument proves too much. An infinite regress results when any
kind of democracy-or any form of government-seeks to define the pre-conditions of
decisionmaking. Michelman succeeds only in showing that direct democracy lacks an
unattainable purity. He also argues that the coercive nature of direct democracy
contradicts the spirit of self-government:
[A]II real-world votes have losers, and none is ever decided by the independent action of
any individual. How, then, is everyone to regard himself or herself as self-governing
through political events from which he or she may have dissented and in which, in any
event, there is no real chance that his or her own vote, or speech, or other political action
decided the outcome?
Id. at 1732. Again, no system of government avoids this criticism: the insistence on perfect
self-government entails anarchism. In the end, Michelman's opposition to direct
democracy is puzzling. Is not the "process in which private-regarding 'men' become
public-regarding citizens and thus members of a people" likely to find more substantial
fulfillment in lawmaking than in recreational clubs? Is not the goal of citizens'
"participation as an equal in public affairs, in pursuit of a common good" promoted when
citizens partake in the drafting of laws? Michelman usefully reminds us that the case for
direct democracy cannot be made deductively or definitionally, because democracy entails
more than a vote. However, he fails to address the empirical case for (or against) direct
democracy, i.e., whether greater resort to the initiative process might further his own
republican ideals.
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proclaimed by Aristotle and echoed through the ages: the cultivation
of more virtuous people living more fulfilled lives.9 And we risk
forfeiting something even more important: the willingness and ability
of citizens to perform their constitutional and political roles-to elect
representatives, to serve on juries or in the military, and to monitor
all the workings of government on every level.
Opponents of direct democracy insist that it plays to the
selfishness of people.7 Might we not build a more unselfish citizenry
by giving people direct responsibility for decisions that affect them
collectively? The human newborn is egocentric. Early in infancy, she
recognizes that her parents and siblings are independent creatures
with interests of their own. Fuller development requires awareness
that these others are part of the child's own organic community: her
well-being and this community's are inextricably linked. The fullest
development comes as she takes responsibility for this community,
and makes decisions that affect it with an eye towards its common
good. This process by which an infant becomes a mature member of
a family (with the family itself maturing in the process) applies as well
to citizens in a polity. ' It is unlikely to happen, however, when our
sole participation consists of electing someone else to make decisions
for us.'72
Skeptics may respond that, however one evaluates the initiative
experience in the Twentieth Century, the process has not visibly
enhanced America's civic maturation. But has direct democracy been
tried enough, and properly enough, for us to foreclose it as a solution
to the problem of an atrophied citizenry? 73
169. See David Hoeveler, Original Intent and the Politics of Republicanism, 75 MARQ.
L. REV. 863, 879 (1992) ("Classical Republicanism, rooted in Aristotle, ascribes to
individuals a telos, or end, that can be answered through the calling of citizenship."); Joan
Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of
City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 83, 106 (1986) ("Jefferson's linkage of
local self-government and republican virtue has proved an enormously influential source
of political imagery since its inception.").
170. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Symposium: Voices of the People: Essays on
Constitutional Democracy in Memory of Professor Julian N. Eule: Practicing Theory: The
Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1735, 1744 n. 21 (1998) (Direct
democracy consists of polarized groups which "scratch and claw at each other.").
171. See generally 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 76.
172. See Brian Beedham, Full Democracy, THE ECONOMIST, December 21, 1996, at 11
(A major purpose of direct democracy is "to encourage ordinary people to grow more
responsible, and to shoulder more of the burden of government themselves-in short, to
become better citizens.").
173. Williams and Michelman are not the only modern day republicans who neglect to
consider whether civic maturation might be promoted by direct democracy. Suzanna
218 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 29:
IV. Direct Democracy Across the Board-A New Approach
The tendency has been to compartmentalize direct democracy by
jurisdiction. For most of this century the push for initiatives has been
almost exclusively at the state and local levels."' By contrast, a
proposed constitutional amendment in the 1970s would have
established national initiative but would have done nothing to bring
direct democracy to the many states that make no provision for
citizen lawmaking.' A new approach, advocated by a group called
"Philadelphia II, ''176 reflects the view that the case for direct
democracy anywhere impels the push for direct democracy
everywhere.
This group has sponsored what it calls the National Initiative For
Democracy, a constitutional amendment and concurrent federal
legislation authorizing citizen lawmaking in every governmental
jurisdiction-federal, state, and local-in the United States.
The proposed constitutional amendment creates a "legislature of
the People" in every governmental jurisdiction of the United States.
The accompanying statute, known as the Democracy Act (henceforth
"DA"), stipulates specific procedures whereby this legislature of the
People may pass initiatives. It includes the means by which an
initiative becomes "qualified" (i.e., gets on a ballot) and the way the
initiative campaign is conducted.
A. Qualification
DA provides three means of qualifying a proposed initiative for
consideration by the voters: (i) approval by the legislature;' 7  (ii)
Sherry seeks a more communitarian society, noting that our current individualist bent
"stunts our capacity for growth." Sherry, supra note 159, at 615. However, her solution is
a public-spirited "jurisprudence." Why not public-spirited lawmaking? If the goal is the
growth of all individuals (as well as the polity collectively), why consign the means of
promoting growth to a very narrow slice of society?
174. See SCHMIDT, supra note 104, at 174 (noting that "[t]he demise of the Progressive
movement in the years just after World War I ended discussion of a national Initiative
process for nearly 50 years").
175. Senate Joint Resolution 67, co-sponsored by Senators Abourezk and Hatfield,
was sent to the Judiciary subcommittee on the Constitution but failed to make it to the
floor. See S. J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1 st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. § 11584 (1977). It was re-
introduced the following year, but again never emerged from committee.
176. The group was started and is led by former United States Senator Mike Gravel
(D. Alaska).
177. According to the Proposed Democracy Act ("DA") Section 3(B)(1): "[t]he
legislative body of the relevant jurisdiction (federal, state, or local) may by resolution,
qualify an initiative for election as it is submitted by its sponsors." As this proposed
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sufficient numbers of signatures of registered voters within the
jurisdiction;178 and (iii) public opinion poll.'79
Currently, many states that use the initiative process rely
exclusively on the gathering of signatures to qualify an initiative,
though some states permit legislatures to place issues on the ballot for
consideration by voters.8 By adding a new means-public opinion
poll-DA would enable the qualification of measures that may be
desirable and/or popular.8 but are not supported by individuals or
groups with sufficient resources to gather signatures or move
representatives.)82
Gathering signatures requires substantial resources. 3 While a
signature requirement thus deters frivolous or excessive numbers of
initiatives,' it does so without reference to whether a particular
statute, and the accompanying constitutional amendment, remain a package in progress,
all references to their provisions are as of February 25, 2002. Readers can find the latest
iteration at www.ni4d.org.
178. Id., § 3(B)(2).
Initiatives that propose laws, changes to laws, or expressions of public policy shall
qualify for election if a petition is signed, manually or electronically, by a number
of registered voters within the relevant jurisdiction equal to at least two percent
of those voting in the presidential election.... Initiatives that propose changes
to constitutions or charters shall qualify for election if a petition is signed by a
number of registered voters within the relevant jurisdiction equal to at least five
percent of the number voting in the last presidential election.... The time
period allotted to gather qualifying petition signatures shall be more than two
years....
Id.
179. Id., § 3(B)(3). "Initiatives that propose or alter constitutions, charters and laws,
or expressions of public policy shall qualify for election if at least fifty percent of the
respondents in public opinion poll express their desire that the initiative qualified for
election .... "
Id. A further provision governing the supervision of the polling process is quoted infra
note 189.
180. At a glance it may seem odd that legislators would ever resort to such a procedure
rather than simply adopting the measure in question. But it may be that some legislators,
while opposed to or undecided about a measure, nevertheless believe that the voice of the
people should be heard.
181. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 122, at 64 (restrictions on ballot access derive
from notion that "initiators ought to be able to demonstrate substantial public support
before the state is put to the expense of conducting a vote.").
182. See David Magleby, Governing By Initiative: Let The Voters Decide? An
Assessment of The Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 36 (1995)
("Most citizens and 'grass roots' groups lack the resources or organizational commitment
to get their issues on statewide ballots.").
183. Most states require that the signatures constitute a certain percentage (usually
around 8%) of the number of voters in the previous gubernatorial election. Some states
require signatures equaling as much as 15% of that total.
184. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 108, at 94 (finding a statistically significant
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measure enjoys popular support. Anyone with enough money can
gather sufficient signatures for almost anything,"' since many people
sign petitions without reading or focusing on them."' Conversely, a
widely supported measure may fail to attain sufficient signatures
simply because supporters lack the requisite resources to circulate
petitions.'
If a large percentage of the voters of a jurisdiction favor a
particular measure, they should not be deprived from voting on it
solely because supporters lack wealth. While some have proposed
addressing this problem by fiddling with the signature-gathering
machinery,"" the crafters of DA propose an alternative path to qualify
initiatives-polling.
189
Of course, polling is not perfectly scientific. The very essence of
a poll involves built-in error. The only way to know how all the
People feel is to have all the People vote. 9" Polls sample only some of
the People, and thus come accompanied by a "margin for error"-a
confession of imprecision. In addition, the way poll questions are
112
worded can determine the outcome."' For these and other reasons,
correlation between the signature requirement and the number of qualifying initiatives).
185. See Daniel Lowenstein & Robert Stern, The First Amendment and Paid Initiative
Petition Circulators: A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 175,
199 (1989) (noting emergence of an industry of paid signature-gatherers who can "buy a
place on the ballot" for "anyone willing to put up the funds.").
186. See id. at 194-200; DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 108, at 96.
187. See, e.g., DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 108, at 97 (noting that signature
requirement of 700,000 in California leaves the initiative process "available only to those
who can mount the kind of highly organized petition circulation effort needed to gather
such a large number of signatures in the 150 days allowed by law.").
188. See, e.g., id. at 100-102.
189. A few commentators have briefly considered and rejected polling as an
alternative means to qualify ballot access, but without a serious rationale. For example,
DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 108, at 106, acknowledge that polls "might be useful for
identifying general areas of public concern or discontent," but claim they are "not suitable
means for asking voters to evaluate specific detailed proposals." They offer no basis for
this assertion.
190. Of course, this too does not gauge public sentiment perfectly, since not all people
vote. It does not even gauge perfectly the sentiments of those who wish to vote, since
presumably some people would like to do so but cannot make it to the polls.
191. See, e.g., Michael Kagay & Janet Elder, Numbers Are No Problem for Pollsters:
Words Are, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, §4, at 5 (documenting dramatic differences in
results of differently worded polls on same subject).
192. For example, different sorts of people tend to be home when pollsters call, or tend
to cooperate with pollsters, among other factors that can skew poll results and are difficult
for pollsters to control.
[Vol. 29:
Winter 2002] DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC MATURATION 221
different polls on the same subject can yield very different results.9
But in the context of using polling to qualify initiatives, these
problems are insignificant. The poll could not create law: it could
only achieve ballot access. Surely, polling has become sufficiently
accurate for that purpose.9' Under DA, a proposed measure
becomes qualified if 50% of the voters of a jurisdiction want it
qualified.9 Obviously a poll that understates the degree of support
does no harm (except to the party that wants the measure qualified,
who then has other available routes). But suppose a poll finds that
52% want measure X qualified, whereas the real figure is 48%. The
measure qualifies, but little harm is done: it won't be adopted unless a
majority of voters are persuaded to support it. To be sure, we don't
want every conceivable initiative proposal to qualify. The 50%
requirement should suffice to screen out measures that lack
significant support.
Of course, we posited only a slight polling error. What about
bias and the wording of questions, factors that can influence
outcomes more substantially? DA anticipates these problems
effectively. It stipulates that for an initiative to qualify by means of
poll, the proposed poll question must be submitted along with the
proposed initiative, to be evaluated by a neutral governing body.'96
Unless this body verifies the bona fides of the proposed poll and
polling organization, the poll will not be approved. '97 Assuming this
governing body can be trusted to act with integrity and competence,
this seems like a reasonable safeguard against abuse of the polling
option.9
193. This is even true where the wording problem is minimal, such as in candidate
elections. Eric Lekus, Rivals Question Pollster's Success, NEWSDAY, Nov. 12, 1996, at 7A
(noting that in final 1996 pre-election polls by eight news organizations, Bill Clinton's lead
over Bob Dole ranged from 7% to 18%).
194. Polling is now used to determine which presidential candidates may participate in
televised debates. Since this can affect who becomes President, it involves far greater
stakes than whether any particular initiative makes it to a ballot.
195. To be more precise, 50% must "express their desire that the initiative qualify for
election." Proposed Democracy Act § 3(B)(3), at http://www.ni4d.org ("Proposed DA").
This makes sense. Some voters may personally oppose a measure but still feel that it
should be subject to majority will.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. The viability of this body, the "Electoral Trust," is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 236-42.
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B. Campaign
DA's most significant measures are designed to promote a fair
and robust campaign process once an initiative qualifies. The drafters
of DA believe that the current initiative process reflects some of the
same flaws that mar the legislative process, especially absence of
deliberation and excessive influence of money and special influence.' 9
DA specifies procedures designed to remedy these problems.
The constitutional amendment accompanying DA would create a
governing body to oversee and administer the entire process: the
"Electoral Trust."2"° This agency would be authorized to "administer
the procedures" of DA across the nation.'"2"' The Electoral Trust, to
be. funded by the federal government,2°2 has a three-part statutorily-
defined mission: (i) making voter registration "as simple and
automatic as possible, with the goal of achieving universal lifetime
registration of eligible voting-age citizens;""2 3 (ii) seeing to it that
"[flair and balanced information" on all qualified initiatives shall be
presented to voters in "English"2" and; (iii) ensuring that voting shall
be "as convenient and as easy as possible for all citizens registered to
vote, including the non-reading, disabled, hospitalized, homebound,
homeless and indigent."2 5
DA specifies that the Electoral Trust will be governed by a
Board of Trustees and a Director.0 6 The Director, appointed by the
President of the United States, and confirmed by a majority vote of
the Trustees, shall serve one six-year term.2 7 While DA gives the
Electoral Trust some flexibility in administering the initiative
199. The drafters are quick to note that the people at large are not to blame-the
initiative process has invariably been enacted by representatives. See MIKE GRAVEL &
DON KEMNER, A PEACEFUL AMERICAN REVOLUTION: INITIATIVE VIA PHILADELPHIA
II 27 (1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
200. Proposed DA § 4.
201. Id.
202. Id. § 4(F).
203. Id. § 4(A)(1). This aspect of the mission statement receives elaboration in section
4(E)(2): "[tihe Electoral Trust shall develop simplified, voter registration procedures and
requirements aimed at universal lifetime registration, which shall be usable and binding in
every government jurisdiction where the voter is a legal resident."
204. Id. § 4(A)(2).
205. Id. § 4(A)(3). This aspect of the mission statement receives elaboration in section
4(E)(7): "[t]he Electoral Trust shall take advantage of contemporary technology in
developing voting procedures for national, state and local initiative elections to facilitate
the citizens' exercise of their legislative power."
206. Id. §§ 4(B) & (C).
207. Id. § 4(C).
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campaign, it spells out a series of binding procedures designed to
create a fair, deliberative process. These include:
1. Public Hearing
When "an initiative qualifies for election, the Electoral Trust
shall appoint a Hearing Officer to conduct public hearings... The
testimony of citizens, proponents, opponents, and experts shall be
solicited" and "their testimony shall be published as the Hearing
Record."2"8
2. Deliberative Committees
The Electoral Trust must organize and convene a committee of
randomly selected ordinary citizens from the relevant jurisdiction
who review the transcript of the hearings, "deliberate the merits of
the initiative, and prepare a written report of its deliberations with its
recommendations. ''2°9 By two-thirds vote the Committee can amend
the text of the initiative, provided that any changes "are consistent
with the stated purposes of the initiative.,
210
3. Legislative Advisory Vote
Following the public hearing, and upon receipt of the
recommendation by the Deliberative Committee, the legislative body
of the relevant jurisdiction must conduct a public vote on the
initiative within sixty days."' The vote serves as a non-binding
recommendation."'
4. Public Information
The Electoral Trust is required to provide a pamphlet about each
qualified initiative with a balanced pro and con analysis of the subject
along with "a summary of the Hearing Record, the Deliberative
Committee report, the results of the Legislative Advisory Vote, and
statements prepared by proponents and opponents." '213  This
information must also be published on a web site and "to the extent
feasible" disseminated to newspapers, radio stations and other
208. Id. § 3(c).
209. Id. § 3(D).
210. Id.
211. Id. § 3(E).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 3(L).
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media."4
5. Campaign Financing
Funding in support of or opposition to initiatives is permitted by
"neutral persons" only, with an explicit ban of contributions from
"corporations, industry groups, labor unions, political action
committees and associations. ,,2 5 So too, "[s]uch entities are
prohibited from coercing or inducing employees, stockholders,
clients, customers, members, or any other associated persons to
support or oppose an initiative."2"6  Violation of this prohibition
would be a felony."7
6. Disclosure
Material identifying those involved in the effort to promote and
defeat the initiative shall also be made public. 8 The names and
relevant organizational affiliations of sponsors of the initiative "shall
appear on the face of the initiative, the petition, and on any printed
matter or other media advocating the initiative... ,,19 The Electoral
Trust shall also establish financial reporting requirements for both
proponents and opponents of the initiative.22° Failure to comply with
these requirements shall be a felony.22" '
These features are accompanied by additional safeguards. Each
initiative is limited to 5,000 words ("exclusive of the Preamble and
language that quotes existing law")," may "address only one subject"
(though it "may include related or mutually dependent parts"), and
must include a summary that "accurately summarizes the initiative's
content., 223 Also, DA explicitly authorizes judicial review to ensure
224the constitutionality of an initiative.
What, then, are we to make of this proposed statute? Are the
means equal to the lofty goal of promoting a superior version of
214. Id. § 3(L)(2).
215. Id. § 3(J).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. § 3(H).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 3(K).
221. Id.
222. Id. § 3(A).
223. Id.
224. Id. § 3(F).
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direct democracy throughout America? 225 There is clearly much to
recommend DA. By virtue of the deliberative committees, public
hearings, legislative roll call, and mandatory dispersal of information
in both the broadcast and print media, interested citizens would
potentially receive far more and better balanced information than is
currently the norm.226 By virtue of some of these features, as well as
the restrictions on funding, the campaigns would seem less subject to
manipulation.
The crafters of DA were attentive to flaws in the current
initiative process (as well as procedures that have proven somewhat
effective). For example, initiatives are sometimes poorly worded.
DA commands the Electoral Trust to establish and operate a
legislative drafting service to assist in the preparation of initiatives.228
DA also provides for changes to the text of initiatives, when a need
becomes apparent during hearings.229
So, too, under the status quo certain initiatives are too long to be
digested and easily understood. 23" As noted, DA limits initiatives to
5,000 words.23" ' Related, in some states initiatives may embrace
225. One other striking feature of DA, the means of its enactment, see infra at text
accompanying notes 316-26.
226. Under current law, only one state, California, requires any kind of hearing on
initiatives: a legislative hearing. A few other states with indirect initiatives sometimes use
such hearings, whereas no states with direct initiatives do so. The fact that states with
indirect initiatives (meaning initiatives first voted on by the legislature) have hearings, and
those with direct initiatives generally do not, suggests that these limited hearings are
aimed at assisting the legislature, not the public. In any case, legislative hearings have not
significantly enhanced public involvement in initiatives. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra
note 108, at 42.
227. Id. at 113 ("A persistent complaint about initiative proposals is that many are
poorly drafted.").
228. Proposed DA § 4(E)(3). Under current law, only eight jurisdictions offer any
formal drafting assistance to initiative proponents; this is a significant problem. See
Collins & Oesterle, supra note 122, at 77 ("The problem of inept drafting arises in large
part from the way initiatives are drafted.... [The drafters] can be inexperienced in the
drafting of legislation.").
229. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 122, at 78 ("The drafting problem is severely
magnified by early freezes of initiatives' wording."). See also Allen, supra note 110, at
1005 ("The critics of initiative also argue that these bills must be taken as given-there is
no way to amend an initiative once the qualifying procedure has begun.").
230. To take one extreme example, in 1988 California voters faced four initiatives on
automobile insurance. Three of them were more than 10,000 words long and one of them
nearly 30,000 words.
231. Proposed DA § 3(A); see also Collins & Oesterle, supra note 122, at 109
(recommending 5,000 word limit).
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several subjects, making them difficult for voters to evaluate. 2 DA
limits initiatives to a single subject.233  In a similar vein, DA's
disclosure provisions spring from recognition that knowing who is
behind a measure 234 is relevant to the public's assessment 235 and that
the initiative process has been marred by deliberate concealment. 36
The devil is in the details. In their exuberance over
democratizing America, leaders of the early initiative movement paid
scant attention to process: roll out the ballots and let the People vote,
they proclaimed, and all will be well.237 The drafters of DA, by
contrast, have drawn on a century's experience to offer a carefully
crafted approach.238
The virtues of DA are illuminated by reference to James
Fishkin's incisive description of the American dilemma. Fishkin
described the "fork in the road for American Democracy" as follows:
[d]own one road, we would have kept the conditions that make
232. Eight states place no limit on the number of subjects that may be addressed by an
initiative. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 122, at 85 ("Bundling of issues is a
recognized abuse" of the initiative process.). Not only are multi-subject initiatives more
difficult to follow, but they force voters to "decide whether to swallow the bitter to get the
sweet." Id. at 111.
233. Proposed DA §3(A) This adopts the process followed in California and a few
other states. See Magleby, supra note 182, at 25-26.
234. DA would require the listing of all significant sponsors of the initiative. Proposed
DA § 3(H). Under current law, only four states require the listing of sponsors.
235. The Supreme Court has recognized as much. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) ("Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a
means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which
they are being subjected.").
236. This, too, the Court has recognized. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1991) ("[W]hen individuals or corporations speak through
committees, they often adopt seductive names that may tend to conceal the true identity
of the source."). In a different case, the Court nevertheless struck down an Ohio
disclosure law which prevented distribution of anonymous campaign literature. In
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), the Ohio Elections Commission
imposed a fine on a woman who distributed a handbill signed by "concerned parents and
tax payers." However, the Court limited its protection to "individuals acting
independently and using only their own modest resources." Id. at 351. This is unlikely to
pose an obstacle to DA's requirement of disclosure of sponsors and significant
contributors, especially since the Court acknowledged the propriety of most laws requiring
financial disclosure of contributions. See id. at 349.
237. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 108, at 127 ("The reformers who brought
about the adoption of the initiative did not devote a lot of attention to the mechanics of
the initiative process.").
238. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 122, at 126-27 ("Abuses of the initiative are
largely caused by structural and procedural flaws. If they are corrected, the initiative can
work .... [Q]uestions of structure and procedure should be an essential part of America's
debate on the merits of state ballot initiatives and proposals for a national initiative.").
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deliberation together possible, even if we would thereby have
limited participation. Traveling the other road, we emphasize
participation even when conditions for deliberation and
discussion are absent. The first road was defended by the
Founders; the second road leads to referendums, primaries, and
the other institutions of mass democracy.239
DA seeks to bridge the divide, refusing to accept a dichotomy
between deliberative democracy and mass democracy. In that regard,
its "deliberative committees" are a key innovation. By gathering
ordinary citizens together in committee, it seeks to capitalize on the
value of face-to-face discussions. The public hearing serves a similar
function, buttressed by the legislative roll call. DA goes to great
lengths to avoid a vote in a vacuum.
Another potentially compelling feature of DA is highlighted by a
separate discussion of Fishkin's, one recalling the theme of civic
maturation. Drawing on the work of economist Anthony Downs,24
Fiskin explained that
[c]itizens in large nation-states have incentives to be "rationally
ignorant." If I have only one vote in millions, why should I
spend a lot of time and effort attempting to inform myself about
the positions of competing candidates, competing parties, or
competing alternatives in an election or a referendum? My
individual vote has such a small chance of making any
difference to the outcome that time and effort invested in
deciding how best to cast that vote will not make any
appreciable difference.... [Flor most citizens, ignorance is,
unfortunately, the rational choice.24'
DA addresses this problem by providing for initiatives at every
level of government, from the town and village up. One's vote on a
national initiative may seem fruitless, but that perspective weakens as
one moves down to the lower rungs of the democratic ladder.
This point becomes strengthened when one broadens the
perspective beyond the mathematics of voting. The average citizen
can have little impact on the debate over a national initiative, but
more so on state issues and potentially a significant influence on local
issues. And the process of becoming engaged and informed may
become habitual for the citizen whose involvement starts at the local
level.
Indeed, by requiring the availability of initiative in every
jurisdiction, DA seeks to do for popular participation what Founding
239. FISHKIN, supra note 18, at 26.
240. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1956).
241. FISHKIN, supra note 18, at 21-22.
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Father James Wilson shrewdly saw the Constitution as doing for the
concept of representation: "defusing this vital principle throughout all
the different divisions and departments of the government." '242 Today,
a citizen of a state which permits initiatives may regard the
availability of this option as adventitious, merely a choice of the state
in which she happens to reside. After all, she will not find provisions
for citizen lawmaking at the federal level, or (in all likelihood) at the
local level, nor in all other states. DA would change that, and thus
change the thinking about direct democracy. No matter how often
the initiative was used, it would be seen as a pervasive tool of
citizenship and thus would recast the role of citizens in government.
In short, DA could create a citizenry far more engaged in civic
affairs. Rather than simply empowering people to vote on issues, it
would establish procedures promoting an informed, deliberative
polity.243  All this may sound Pollyannaish. Certainly, DA faces
obstacles which need to be considered.
C. The Ban on Corporate Financing
One important feature of DA would be vulnerable to rejection
by the Supreme Court. As noted, DA limits contributions to
initiative campaigns to "persons. 24 4  This provision could help
liberate the initiative process from domination by political action
committees and well-heeled corporate entities. However, in 1978 the
Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that banned
banks and various other corporations from making expenditures on
certain initiative issues.245 Is the provision in DA limiting financing to
"persons" therefore doomed?
242. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 76, at 312.
243. Significantly, the DA would supplement, not replace, representative government.
(Indeed, within the initiative process itself, the legislative bodies would weigh in.) This
point bears emphasis, insofar as some critics of direct democracy claim that initiative
"does not supplement representation, it sits above representation." Clark, supra note 96,
at 1569. Clark asserts that "[d]irect democracy, where it exists in the United States, always
trumps representative democracy. An initiative can overrule the legislature." Id. In fact,
unless state law stipulates to the contrary, a statute passed by the legislature can overrule
an initiative as easily as the other way around. Half the states that permit initiatives place
no restrictions on legislative repeal, and in most of the other states restrictions are minor.
DA itself places no limits on legislative action.
244. Proposed DA § 3(J).
245. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978). Specifically, the statute
prohibited appellants from making contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of...
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one
materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation." Id. at 768.
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Not necessarily. The divided Court, in a case twenty years ago
(when only two current members of the Court served),246 did not rule
out measures limiting or eliminating corporate expenditures in the
initiative process. Rather, it demanded a stronger showing than
Massachusetts had mustered that such measures are necessary to
promote a fairer process. The Court based its decision largely on an
empirical judgment that seems outdated today: "there has been no
showing that the relative voice of corporations has been
overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in
Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of
the citizenry in government." '247 The Court implied that such a
showing could justify legislation banning corporate expenditures on
initiative campaigns:
[a]ccording to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful
and their views may drown out other points of view. If
appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative
findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to
undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather
than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would
merit our consideration.248
Were the Court to revisit the issue of campaign limitations on
initiatives, it would be forced to ponder much data.249 With the
benefit of two more decades of initiatives, and an astronomical rise in
spending by "non-persons," proponents of DA would provide the
Court an ample basis to jettison Bellotti.
The Court was unmoved by the claim that limitations on
corporate expenditures would reduce corruption. Acknowledging a
risk of corruption in candidate elections, the Court maintained that
this risk "simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue. 25 °
It is hard to imagine the Court endorsing that sentiment today.
Supporters and opponents of direct democracy are united in the
recognition that initiative campaigns have been tainted by
corruption."'
246. One of those members, now-Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented (on the ground
that corporations are not "persons" entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection). Id. at
822.
247. Id. at 789-90.
248. Id. at 789.
249. For example, in California more than 80% of contributions of more than $100 to
ballot measure committees are made by political action committees. Charlene Simmons,
1997 CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU 12-13 (1997).
250. Belotti, 435 U.S. at 790.
251. See, e.g., DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 108, at 199 (disputing Court's contention
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D. The Role of the Electoral Trust
A potentially serious criticism of DA is that a government
agency cannot be expected to administer elections fairly and
effectively all over America.2 Especially given the fact that one
rationale for DA is distrust of government institutions, why should we
expect the Electoral Trust to be incorruptible? Wouldn't it inevitably
be at the beck and call of the very representatives (and powerful
private entities) we distrust?
However, the drafters of DA had a successful model to work
from-the Federal Reserve Board ("FED"), which oversees
America's banking system. The FED arose from a perceived need for
an agency with appropriate expertise to govern America's monetary
policy in a way that is free from political interference but not free of
all accountability. Accordingly, the chairman is appointed by the
President to a renewable four-year term. This guards against a
dangerous, unaccountable leader (as does the fact that the chairman
is answerable to a board), but most of what the FED does is free of
governmental interference."'
The FED has become the envy of government-run banking
institutions worldwide' and perhaps a suitable model for other
institutions as well.255 While obviously some observers disapprove the
policies of this or that FED Board, few dispute that the organization
has maintained the independence and integrity necessary for effective
policy-making. Indeed, the few critics of the FED as an institution
tend to complain that it is too independent and powerful.256
DA's Electoral Trust seems loosely modeled after the FED.5
that initiatives are free of corruption and noting "extensive history" to the contrary).
252. While a national Electoral Trust is a novel idea, one commentator has proposed
that states create an "independent commission to oversee the initiative process." Arne
Leonard, In Search Of The Deliberative Initiative: A Proposal For A New Method Of
Constitutional Change, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1203, 1227 (1996).
253. See DONALD KETTL, LEADERSHIP AT THE FED 1-17 (1986).
254. See, e.g., Colin Narbrough, Independent Banks Lose Shine, LONDON TIMES, Apr.
15, 1991 (noting that Governor of the Bank of England, unhappy with dependence of
England's central bank on the government, "may have found a role model. America's
Federal Reserve Board, even freer of political interference than the Bundesbank, has
provided evidence of the merits of independence.").
255. See, e.g., James Guthrie, American Education Reform: What is Needed is
'National,' Not 'Federal,' 17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 125 (1997) (proposing Federal
Reserve Board as a model for American educational system).
256. See, e.g., WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE (1995).
257. The drafters of DA may also have benefited from a negative model. The Federal
Election Commission, which enforces federal campaign finance and election law, is widely
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Like the FED, the Electoral Trust will essentially be an independent
agency, though with a degree of accountability to the political
branches. The director is appointed by the President and Congress
controls its purse strings.2' The director is limited to one term and
operates at the discretion of a Board.259 As the FED has maintained
its independence, there is no reason to assume that the Electoral
Trust would fail to do So.26
E. Potential Problems with National Initiative
1. Professor Black's Critique
National initiative creates some risks different from and greater
than those at the state level, and the outcome is less certain. We lack
not only experience, but analysis. Scrutiny of direct democracy has
focused on its variants at the state level, because that's where the
action is. Before taking the plunge into something as far-reaching as
national initiative, we must carefully consider possible drawbacks.
In the late 1970s, the United States Congress briefly considered a
constitutional amendment to create national initiative.2 '  Far less
developed than DA, the Hatfield/Abourezk proposal essentially
provided for the enactment of laws by majority vote in a national
election. It contained no procedures to promote deliberation,
disclosure, or fairness.262 During the pendency of this amendment,
regarded as "a weak and ineffective agency unable to fulfill its mandate." Amanda S.
LaForge, Note, The Toothless Tiger: Structural, Political, and Legal Barriers to Effective
FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM U. 351, 352
(1996). The FEC's problems include the lack of a structurally strong chairperson. See id.
at 362-65. Six commissioners serve rotating one-year terms as chair, essentially a figure-
head position. See id. Also problematic is the highly partisan and politicized appointment
process (with heavy involvement of Congress) of all commissioners. See id.
258. Proposed DA §§ 4(C) & (D).
259. Proposed DA § 4(C).
260. The Electoral Trust's task is daunting-overseeing the initiative process in
hundreds of jurisdictions. Needless to say, it would have to delegate and decentralize
responsibilities. In this way, too, it resembles the Federal Reserve Board-the FED's
operations are conducted by twelve Federal Reserve Banks in cities throughout the
country.
261. S. J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1 st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. § 11584 (1977).
262. The relevant sections were as follows:
Section 2: A law is proposed by presenting to the chief law enforcement officer of
the United States a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed law and
contains signatures, collected within the eighteen months prior to such
presentation, of registered voters equal in number to 3 percent of the ballots cast
in the last general election for President and which includes the signatures of
registered voters in each of ten states .... Within 90 days of such presentation,
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Professor Charles Black, a rare legal scholar to address the unique
problems of national direct democracy, wrote a harsh critique.263 It is
instructive to explore the viability of his attack, and the extent to
which DA is susceptible to it. Some of Professor Black's criticisms
apply equally to statewide initiative,2" and some we have already
addressed.165 The most significant criticisms, for present purposes, are
the chief law enforcement officer of the United States shall determine the
validity of the signatures contained in such petition .... Upon a determination
that such petition contains the required number of valid signatures, he shall
certify such petition [and have it placed on the ballot of the next national
election].
Section 3: A proposed law shall be enacted upon approval by a majority of the
people casting votes with respect to such proposed laws.
Id., see also Charles L. Black Jr., National Lawmaking by Citizen Initiative? Let's Think
Twice, in THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 108-09 n.1 (1986).
263. See Black, supra note 262, at 106-17.
264. For example, Professor Black argues that Congress makes law in a larger context,
with the big picture in view, whereas initiatives would produce measures voted on in
isolation; the mix of laws might be poor, and no one will consider the mix. Id. As he puts
it, national initiative "leads to and supports no system or plan of government," whereas in
Congress, "a great deal is known and considered ... about the interactions and
interrelations of particular provisions. Such knowledge and consideration at least makes
possible, if it does not always produce, legislation that works well within the general
frame." Id. at 114-15 (emphasis in original). Lacking a view of the "general frame,"
initiative voters would produce "a series of ad hoc interventions either ineffective or
wreaking needless havoc." Id. at 115. National initiative would "encourage[] simplistic
solutions to problems piecemeal-a recipe for chaos" and could "easily produce 50 or 100
proposals on every biennial ballot." Id.
DA proponents can make two replies. First, DA provides a deliberative process (which
involves representatives). If a particular initiative would not fit within a larger system or
plan, that would be an argument against it. Second, DA in no way replaces representative
government: if national initiative produced some jagged or discordant pieces of law, our
elected officials would retain the ability to mold them into a coherent structure. See
Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1350 (1985) (book
review) ("[T]he legislature and the initiative not only coexist but interact in a system of
lawmaking."). Finally, not even the harshest critics of state initiatives (which generally
lack the kind of deliberation that DA contemplates) maintain that they have wreaked
havoc in the states. The amount of legislation proposed and passed has been relatively
small. See supra note 121.
265. For example, Professor Black observed that Hatfield/Abourezk lacked "provision
for any responsible deliberation." BLACK, supra note 262, at 112. He noted that
congressional lawmaking proceeds through the committee process, aided by specialists
and staff. See id. at 113. The process involves "give-and-take, of perception and tackling
of problems as to substance and as to wording-the process, in other words, by which
sensible people try to reach a sensible result in a binding enactment." Id. Professor Black
acknowledged that "this process does not always work at its ideal best," but observed that
the proposed national initiative "contains not so much as a possibility of anything of the
sort." Id. Instead, any deliberation or debate would be through "some unmandated and
unofficial process... voluntary in the particular case." Id. Moreover, there would
presumably be a long lag time between the initial gathering of signatures and the eventual
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* 266those which apply primarily or exclusively to nationwide initiative.
Absence of Presidential veto
Professor Black noted that Hatfield/Abourezk left no place for
the presidential veto, "incomparably the greatest of the presidential
powers." '267 Removing this power, Black warned, would "enormously
weaken the presidency."268  However, he failed to explain how
national initiative would weaken the presidency, and it is unclear why
it would have a profound effect. There is little reason to believe that
citizens would attempt to micromanage foreign policy or intrude on
other basic presidential prerogatives.
By analogy, state initiatives bypass the governor's veto, but no
one has alleged that they have eviscerated the power of governors.
Indeed, the initiative process can strengthen the hand of governors.
Governors are more visible and audible than legislators, and thus
generally have more influence on the public. Some have wielded this
power to influence the course of initiative voting and have threatened
to go over the heads of legislators as a means to achieving more
favorable legislation.269
Because of his unmatched visibility, the President typically
wields even more influence with the public than any governor.
National initiative would enhance the potency of one of the
vote, "with no possibility of change to meet new thoughts or new circumstances." Id. This
analysis posed persuasive objections to Hatfield/Abourezk, but not to DA. DA, we have
seen, establishes a process of deliberation, and permits amendment along the way. Id. at
113.
Professor Black also argues that the national initiative process would be at the mercy of
money. He notes that "[m]oney could... get pretty much any proposal on the ballot"
and "would have an immense advantage, too, in putting the affirmative case forward,
through all the so-called media, toward election day, the day of the plebiscite." Id. at 115-
16. While it is true that signature-gathering comes down to resources, DA stipulates
polling as an alternative means of qualifying an initiative. Proposed DA § 3(B)(3). Once
an initiative is qualified, DA's procedures would impede financial dominance. See supra
text accompanying notes 215-17.
The process of legislation by our representatives, currently the only means of national
lawmaking, has certainly become hostage to financial power. DA would reduce, not
increase that advantage. Does anyone doubt, for example, that over the last several
decades gun control measures would have fared better if placed on a ballot before the
American people than they fared in Washington where the gun lobby had
disproportionate influence because of its superior resources?
266. While the American people have not clamored for national initiative, they appear
to favor the concept. See supra note 91.
267. BLACK, supra note 262, at 111.
268. Id. at 112.
269. See Magleby, supra note 182, at 29.
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President's chief weapons-the bully pulpit.20 This might more than
compensate for the President's inability to veto laws produced by
initiative.
Bypass of Senate
Professor Black also argued that national initiative essentially
bypasses the United States Senate. Whereas measures passed via a
national initiative would likely pass the House they may well fail in
the Senate, where each state receives equal representation regardless
of population.272 Professor Black argues that this de facto Senate
bypass violates the spirit and perhaps letter of Article V of the United
States Constitution, which seems to lock into place equal
representation of states in the Senate.7 3
This argument mistakenly assumes that Article V is the only
means of amending the Constitution. As discussed in Part I, the more
persuasive reading recognizes that Article V provides only one means
of amending the Constitution, and direct amendment by the People
another. Under this reading, the provision prohibiting amendments
that compromise equality of Senate representation limits Article V
amendment only.
However, Professor Black's concern about the Senate bypass
transcends the Article V wrinkle. He notes that the Senate emerged
as "an indispensable part of the Great Compromise of 1787, ' 274
recognizing that an appeal to tradition carries limited weight.275 He
270. See Michael Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary,
Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 827, 890 (1996) ("[O]ne of the most important devices of a modern president is his
ability to mobilize support through the bully pulpit ... ").
271. Since each representative represents roughly the same number of constituents, a
bill supported by a majority of Americans will typically be supported in a majority of
congressional districts. At least to the extent house members read their mail, and wish to
remain in office, they will often be persuaded to adopt a measure strongly and visibly
supported by their constituents.
272. Where the Senate is concerned, all the voters of California have no more weight
than all the voters of Alaska. As a result, when a measure supported by the majority of
Americans is not supported by a majority of states, it will likely be rejected by the Senate.
273. See U.S. CONST. art. V ("[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate.").
274. BLACK, supra note 262, at 110.
275. After all, several unsavory features of the Constitution, especially clauses
protecting slavery, also emerged as crucial compromises. See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H.
Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone? 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 22 (1997)
(noting, in the context of equal representation in the Senate, that "historical explanation is
not contemporary justification").
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adds that it "is not at all clear that [the Great Compromise] is not of
great benefit even today .... ,276
He offers no elaboration. Nor have others taken up this point.2
For that matter, as a general proposition, the Senate has received
scant scholarly attention.27" This neglect may reflect the fact that the
Great Compromise has little ongoing significance, i.e., the Senate
does not play a distinctive role. Nevertheless, we ought to consider
whether Professor Black was on to something. Should we be
concerned that national initiative effects a kind of end run around the
Senate?
The Great Compromise protected small states by giving the
states equal representation in one branch of the legislature. Such
protection could be sacrificed by national initiative. Take, for
example, oil exploration in Alaskan wilderness. This might be
popular nationwide but unpopular in Alaska. In a national initiative,
the people of Alaska would be outnumbered by literally hundreds of
millions. In the United States Senate, though, they are outnumbered
only forty-nine to one, and their two senators can exercise
disproportionate influence through a filibuster or the usual horse-
trading. Or imagine a measure that would benefit urban America at
the expense of family farms. Such a measure might enjoy majority
support nationally but would be detrimental to enough states that it
might fail to pass the Senate.
Isn't such protection of states exactly what the Framers had in
mind by giving each state two senators? Not really. To be sure, the
Framers recognized that in the Senate "the influence of the states
should prevail to a certain extent." '279 However, as Professor Vikram
Amar has demonstrated, the Framers envisioned equal
276. BLACK, supra note 262, at 110.
277. This is partly because most scholarship on direct democracy focuses on state
initiative. One other commentator who addressed national initiative also expressed
concern about the Senate bypass. However, he too failed to provide much elaboration.
See Allen, supra note 110, at 1044.
278. See Vikram D. Amar, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1112
(1988) (The Senate "has largely been ignored in the legal literature."). The literature on
the legislative branch generally "discuss[es] Congress without distinguishing between the
two Houses" and thus there has been little "analysis of the Senate's place and function in
the constitutional scheme." Id.
279. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 40, at 319. See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION 179 (1833) (Equal vote in the Senate is a "constitutional recognition"
of state sovereignty and an "instrument for the preservation of it." It safeguards against
"a consolidation of the states into one simple republic.").
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representation as protecting states' rights rather than interests."' The
Framers' own words28 ' and assorted features of the Constitution ,282
support Amar's conclusion that "when the interests of the state and
those of the union pointed in opposite directions, the Senator was to
look to the good of the entire public.283
If this were true in 1787, imagine how much more so today.
Reconstruction and other developments have enhanced the sense of
America as a nation. Despite the Supreme Court's minirevival of
Tenth Amendment federalism, the notion of states' rights packs far
less wallop than it once did. So too, the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, providing direct election of senators rather than
selection by state legislatures, further diminished the sense of the
Senate as a body beholden to the states.2 5 To the extent the national
initiative effectively bypasses the Senate, it merely continues a two-
century trend toward nationalization. 6
It may be argued that another important feature distinguishes
the Senate from the House: senators have longer terms than House
members which, in turn, insulates senators from public opinion. The
Senate can resist rash action and assure deliberation and
consideration of the big-picture. As George Washington allegedly
put it, "we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.
287
Would not national initiative compromise that crucial role of the
Senate?
In reality, this role of the Senate has already disappeared.m8
280. See Amar, supra note 278, at 1116-18.
281. See id. (citing assorted founding comments).
282. See id. at 1130 ("Senators were to vote individually, not as a block from each
state. Second, senators were unrecallable. Third, Senators were paid from the national
treasury, not those of home states.").
283. Id. at 1117 (emphasis in original).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Tenth
Amendment prohibits Congress from regulating guns in schools).
285. See Amar, supra note 278, at 1128-29 ("If state legislatures have a more coherent
vision of a state's interests than the citizens do, direct election may make it easier for a
Senator to consider the interests of the union, not just those of his state.").
286. At the end of the day, if national initiative infringes not just the interests but the
constitutional rights of states, judicial review by an independent judiciary will be available.
Proposed DA § 3 (F).
287. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 285 (1996).
288. See, e.g., George Will, Senate: Impediment to the People? TIMES-PACAYUNE, Apr.
30, 1995, at B7 (noting Framers' vision of Senate as detached and deliberative body, but
observing that "today the Senate is a far cry from what the Founders intended ... ").
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Because of the abolition of indirect election, and the rise of careerism
in the Senate (among other things), the difference between the House
and Senate has waned.89  Senators still have longer terms, but six
years pass quickly enough and senators, no less than House members,
are fearful of losing their seats. ° Where public opinion is strong and
visible, senators generally fail to resist it.
291
Moreover, we need not assume that national initiative will itself
lack deliberation and coolheadedness. To the extent national
initiative promotes a deliberative process, concern about the Senate
bypass becomes even more attenuated 2
Too Risky
The states provide laboratories for experimentation, 93 and
failure in any one is not catastrophic. Initiatives in a given state
cannot destroy the national economy, or national security, or the
nation's social fabric. National initiative involves higher stakes.
Professor Black makes this point by way of medical metaphor.
He considers national initiative "deeply invasive and hazardous" 94
and opines that "no competent doctor would perform comparably
289. See John Hart Ely, The Apparent Inevitability of Mixed Government, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 283,289 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29,79 (1985).
290. See Will, supra note 288 (Senators, "almost as much as house members, are in a
constant campaign mode" and "subservience to [public] opinion... is at least as pervasive
in the Senate as in the House.").
291. See, e.g., ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK
NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 151-52, 158-59, 288-90 (1989) (noting impact of polling
data on senators votes' on Bork nomination); Overby et al., Courting Constituents? An
Analysis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Judge Clarence Thomas, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 997, 1002 (1992) (same with respect to Thomas nomination). This is not to suggest
that representatives are always responsive to the views of their constituents. When the
public is not vigorously engaged, Congress is far less likely to be responsive. And
Congress will sometimes directly defy the will of the public, albeit as quietly as possible.
See Michael Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 677, 679 (1993) (noting "Senate's 'midnight
pay raise' of 1991").
292. One other distinctive constitutional feature of the Senate is its exclusive
responsibility for certain actions--confirming presidential appointments, ratifying treaties,
and trying impeachments. However, this feature would be unaffected by national
initiative. Even assuming the Framers had good reason to give the Senate special
responsibilities, and that these reasons retain their vitality today, national initiative poses
no threat to them.
293. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
294. BLACK, supra note 262, at 108.
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drastic surgery on the ground that it might do a little good to a patient
not very sick." '295 He cautions that our representative government is
"very, very far from being so defective as to justify major and risky
surgery 2916 and "[o]ur representative democracy can and... will
respond to whatever energy, conviction and knowledge the American
people can bring to choosing representatives and to presenting to
those representatives their desires and thoughts."29
If this last observation seems quaint, one must remember that it
was written two decades ago-two decades that brought check-
bouncing, post-midnight pay hikes, government shut-downs, a
partisan presidential impeachment, and a campaign finance system
widely perceived as corrupt.
If Professor Black evinces overconfidence in the prospect of
representatives reforming representative government, he may also
exaggerate the risk of the national initiative. He worries that it could
destroy integral parts of our constitutional scheme. He notes, for
example, the delicate power of Congress to reduce or expand the
jurisdiction of the courts, and asks rhetorically: "do you think well of
a scheme that would subject powers over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to the hazard of agitation for some three million
signatures, followed by a plebiscite?" '298
Professor Black did not consult the experience with state
initiatives, where voters have not upset basic structures of
government.'" And if they did? Unless one assumes that our current
system is perfect, we need not cringe at the thought that American
citizens, after a serious deliberative process, may decide to change
things like courts' jurisdiction (subject to revisiting by either the
legislature or the People, at any point down the road).
Another weakness in Professor Black's surgery analogy lies in his
incomplete diagnosis of the ailment. If we focus only on the state of
295. Id.
296. Id. at 117.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 115.
299. And the risk may well be smaller in national initiatives than statewide initiatives.
As one commentator observes:
National initiatives will undoubtedly be subjected to much greater scrutiny than
state initiatives. Who is backing a bill and why, is more likely to be exposed, and
the actual strengths and weaknesses of any particular measure surely will receive
even greater attention than is now the case in the states. Reason suggests, then,
that the results on national initiatives will be at least as commendable as the
results we have gotten in the states.
Allen, supra note 110, at 1041.
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the union narrowly construed, e.g., economic growth and foreign
affairs, we will surely conclude that America requires no major
surgery. If we focus instead on whether self-government has matured
our people and polity, we may reach a different conclusion.
Today, even educated and once-active citizens fail to register or
to vote, much less to keep abreast of public affairs. One could cite
such apathy as evidence of the folly of citizen lawmaking, but this
conclusion perpetuates a Catch-22. People who feel detached from
government will not become trained in the exercise of self-
government. The relegation of public issues to government officials
has caused the People's civic muscles to atrophy through disuse.
Overwrought politicians sometimes declare America to be on the
verge of collapse.3' Such apocalyptic predictions should not blind us
to a more realistic risk: a continued deterioration of our polity to the
point where we have self-government in name only. 1
So understood, the condition of our country is worse than
Professor Black implied (not to mention worse than it was when he
weighed in). Additionally, the risks of direct democracy are not as
great as he implied, at least if we were to adopt DA rather than the
comparatively primitive initiative proposal Black critiqued."
All that said, DA would establish such far-reaching change that it
would make sense to experiment with its procedures in a few states
before deciding whether to adopt it nationwide. That way we would
see whether the Electoral Trust could perform its functions as
envisioned, and whether the various procedures set forth by DA
would indeed result in a fairer, more deliberative process. Needless
to say, reforms do not always turn out as hoped, and sometimes
produce negative unforeseen consequences.
300. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Liberties; Keyes Goes Kaboom, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1999 at 4-17. (noting presidential candidate Alan Keyes' "apocalyptic declarations,"
including: "[b]race yourself for immediate disintegration").
301. See Broder, supra note 1 (citing astonishing level of apathy among Americans as
revealed in recent national poll, and noting that the pollsters, the respected Peter Hart and
Robert Teeter, "emphasized that the poll represents a sense that government no longer
belongs to the people").
302. Here, two points warrant repeating. First, DA would not replace representative
government. It is not as if the people at large would suddenly draft the federal budget or
decide troop deployments. Second, DA explicitly affirms the availability of judicial
review-initiatives that violate the Constitution will be struck down.
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2. Majority Tyranny Revisited
Earlier we argued that the fear that direct democracy will
tyrannize minorities is exaggerated.3 3 However, that argument was in
the context of state initiatives. Shouldn't we be more fearful of
majority tyranny by national initiative?
To be sure, one key safeguard against state oppression, freedom
to migrate to another state, is not available where national initiatives
are enacted. However, America's large, heterogeneous population
mitigates against oppressive majoritarian action at the national level.
No stable majority emerges across all issues. People know they will
sometimes be in a minority, and thus may hedge their bets, by
exercising restraint when they are in a majority." As James Madison
reminded us, an individual state is far more likely to be dominated by
a single tyrannical majority faction than is the nation.0  Indeed, while
there remain instances of what might be called majority tyranny in
some states,3° this is rarely the case at the national level.
Apart from the safety in numbers, it may be that the American
people are more virtuous than they are given credit for. I say this, of
course, not unmindful of the nation's shameful historical treatment of
blacks and other minorities. Note, however, that much of the
mistreatment occurred at the state and local rather than national
level.30 7 (Moreover, most of it was effected by legislatures rather than
the People at large.) 31
3. The Special Risk of Constitutional Amendment
Earlier we noted that one safeguard against improper citizen
303. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
304. Because each citizen sees herself in the minority on some issues, each is likely to
embrace--consciously or unconsciously-a general idea of minority rights. For example, a
conservative Catholic, tempted to constitutionalize his values and ban contraception, will
recognize the dangers (and perhaps also the unfairness) of doing so when a very different
majority threatens a constitutional amendment that would take away his gun.
Recognizing that their party will not always be in power, most people want limits on
governmental authority, out of long-term self-interest if not out of respect for others.
Strong majorities would likely always rally behind some protection of minority or
individual rights to property, privacy, free exercise of religion, due process, equal
protection, and so on.
305. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 21, at 83-84.
306. Laws criminalizing the sexual intimacy of homosexuals seem like a reasonable
candidate for that designation.
307. HIRSCH & AMAR, supra note 6, at 24.
308. Id. at 37.
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lawmaking is judicial review-laws that contravene the Constitution
will be overturned. How about initiatives that change the
Constitution?3" Even if we accept the risks of national initiatives that
produce statutes, shouldn't we dread the prospect of citizens
amending the federal Constitution?310
One response is that not everything in the Constitution is
amendable: certain key provisions cannot be erased without
essentially abolishing the Constitution itself.3 ' Since the Constitution
recognizes popular sovereignty as an inalienable right of the People,312
then popular sovereignty cannot be amended away. "We the People"
can alter our government provided that we do not undermine the
very basis of our right-or the right of future generations-to so act.
This means, at a minimum, that national initiative could not amend
the Constitution to freeze all or part of it.
Other amendments, too, would impermissibly impede popular
sovereignty. We cannot abolish elections, or eliminate free speech, or
reduce its scope to the point that self-government becomes
impossible.3
Perhaps such limitations on amendment by initiative will be
deemed trivial. National initiative is less likely to undermine popular
sovereignty in the ways described above than to trample the rights of
minorities in various invidious ways. I have argued that this fear is
exaggerated, but what if I am wrong? Suppose a nationwide majority
309. These DA explicitly exempts from judicial review, except in the case of fraud.
Proposed DA, § 3(F).
310. In Part I, I argued that the People already enjoy the inalienable right to amend
the Constitution through national initiative. Nevertheless, by formalizing this right, and
providing a mechanism for its exercise, DA would obviously exacerbate the risks
associated with this right.
311. See 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 76, at 304 (arguing that the
People may make any amendment except one "contrary to the act of original
association").
312. See supra text accompanying notes 51-85.
313. To be sure, these restrictions cannot be externally enforced. See AMAR &
HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 21 (noting that since "the People could-legitimately-amend
the Supreme Court (or its powers of judicial review) out of existence," the courts generally
lack power to review amendments passed directly by the people). This conclusion may
seem surprising, but is inevitable. After all, someone must be the ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution; in a regime where the people are sovereign, that power falls to them. By
analogy, in England certain actions are off-limits to Parliament, but Parliament remains
the ultimate arbiter. The principle-sovereignty-is the same in America, except here the
People are the sovereign body. The fact that limits on constitutional amendments by
initiative cannot be externally enforced does not render the limits meaningless.
Parliament generally respects limits on its authority: why assume the American people
would do otherwise? The restrictions on amendment should guide deliberation.
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deemed homosexuality a crime punishable by incarceration? Or,
perhaps, resegregated schools? Or stripped from the Constitution any
semblance of a right to privacy?
Under current law, the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause
and Due Process Clause prevent these sorts of actions: if Congress or
a state passes the kinds of measures described above, the courts will
declare them unconstitutional. What happens, though, when a
zealous majority uses national initiative to repeal the Equal
Protection Clause and other foundational constitutional
protections?314 Can we afford to take the chance that certain classes
of citizens would be oppressed?
The flaw in this attack is its assumption that a representative
regime poses no such risk. Representative government, not citizen
lawmaking, protected slavery and Jim Crow. The risk lies not in self-
government, but in government: no regime is perfect. A regime that
supplements representative democracy with citizen lawmaking at all
levels is not utopian but should not be compared to some utopian
ideal. If our citizenry and polity have not and will not achieve civic
maturation under a representative regime, we should give serious
thought to putting our selves into self-government. We should not be
deterred by the possibility that direct democracy (like representative
democracy) will be severely flawed, or the certainty that it will be
imperfect.
In any event, the drafters of the National Initiative For
Democracy were sensitive to the heightened risk of constitutional
amendments. Accordingly, the proposed constitutional amendment
stipulates that initiatives that modify constitutions or charters require
affirmation in two elections separated by at least six months."5 The
second election, which will likely attract a healthy dose of media
attention, should enhance the deliberative process and safeguard
against ill-conceived amendments.
314. Again, though, it is extremely unlikely that anything resembling this parade of
horribles would actually transpire. As an empirical matter, citizen lawmaking at the state
level has not unleashed majority tyranny (where it is far more likely to occur than at the
national level), and many states permit citizens to amend their state Constitution through
popular vote.
315. Proposed Deomocracy Amendment to the Constitution §2, at http://www.ni4d.org
(last visited April 7, 2002) ("Proposed Democracy Amendment").
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V. Means of Enacting DA
Because the crafters of DA are convinced that elected
representatives would never enact it, they have sought other means of
enactment.316 Initially they sought to utilize the initiative process
within a single state, asking the voters of that state to approve a
measure enacting DA within its own borders and creating the
Electoral Trust to promote it nationwide. That effort was struck
down by the Supreme Court of Washington,31 and Philadelphia II
now pursues a different means of enactment.
As noted, the group will now formally present to the United
States electorate, in ballot form, two measures simultaneously: a
constitutional amendment and a legislative act (DA). The
amendment establishes the legitimacy of the concurrent act, and
creates the Electoral Trust to administer the system of nationwide
initiative provided for by the concurrent act. The package, called the
National Initiative For Democracy (henceforth "NID"), will take
effect when it receives votes from registered voters equaling fifty
percent of the number of votes cast in the most recent presidential
election. The measure must, however, gain the requisite support
within seven years of its date of submission, and citizens who vote in
favor of the amendment may withdraw their vote at any point prior to
its adoption."
Can a constitutional amendment be adopted directly by the
American people in this fashion? As I have argued in Part I, and
Professor Amar and I have argued elsewhere,"9 the Constitution
recognizes the inalienable right of the American people to amend the
Constitution directly through majority vote. However, as Professor
Amar and I observed, not all purported means of expressing majority
preference are legitimate. We noted, among other things, the
Framers' respect for majority "judgment" as opposed to mere "will,"
and argued that any process of direct amendment must safeguard
against rash or transient action.320
Before assessing whether NID's direct vote mechanism conforms
to these criteria, we must ask whether it meets the sine qua non of any
316. See GRAVEL & KEMNER, supra note 199, at 35 ("If history be our guide ... there
is little likelihood representative government will bring forward [DA].").
317. Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 128 Wash. 2d 707; 911 P.2d 389 (1996).
318. Proposed Democracy Amendment § 7.
319. AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 5-19.
320. Id. at 26-27.
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direct amendment: will it necessarily reflect the will and judgment of
the majority? Here, things get tricky. There is, inescapably, this
question: majority of what? NID calls for a majority of the number of
voters in the most recent presidential election."' It may be improper
to define the relevant polity in this fashion. Citizens are entitled not
to vote without forfeiting their citizenship. This problem can be
solved by changing the criterion for NID passage to half of all
registered voters.
A second question arises: what if voters wish to change their
minds? After all, seven years is a long time. 2 NID appropriately
addresses this issue by authorizing voters to rescind their vote at any
time prior to passage.2 3 As a corollary, NID might stipulate that the
majority voting to adopt it must be in place for a certain period of
time. Thus, for example, NID may take effect a year after a majority
has approved it-provided that it remains a majority, i.e., there have
not been sufficient rescissions to take support below a majority.
With these changes, NID seems to present a reasonable means of
adoption of a constitutional amendment. It sets the bar high in
several respects: requiring substantial support by defining the
relevant majority in an inclusive way; ensuring that support is
relatively stable by limiting passage to seven years (as some Article V
amendments do); and further ensuring stability by permitting
rescission at any point along the way, including for a period after the
amendment initially achieves majority support.
Nevertheless, it would be preferable if nationwide initiative were
passed as a statute by Congress (or an amendment pursuant to
Article V procedures), thus avoiding any debate about the propriety
of its enactment.24 It is not inconceivable that Congress would
deprive itself of its monopoly over national lawmaking. Remember
term limits. Term limits invade the turf of representatives far more
321. Proposed Democracy Amendment § 7.
322. This is also a problem in connection with the Article V amendment, where states
may wish to rescind their support for an amendment. See The Equal Rights Amendment
and Article V: A Framework for Analysis of the Extension and Rescission Issues, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 494 (1978).
323. See Proposed Democracy Amendment § 7.
324. To be sure, it is unclear whether Congress has the authority to enact NID as
federal legislation. Congress might have such authority pursuant to Article IV's
Guarantee Clause, but arguably that clause grants power to the President, not to
Congress. See Adam Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutors of
State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 416 (1989) ("Among the powers granted
to the federal government, those granted in Article IV are unique because they are not
assigned to any particular branch of government.").
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than national initiative: term limits cost representatives their jobs.
Nevertheless, the representatives of Utah enacted term limits for
themselves 25 and the United States Congress came reasonably close
to doing so.326
Representatives who want to keep their jobs badly enough, and
who understand that direct democracy supplements rather than
replaces representative democracy, might support nationwide
initiative if sufficient public pressure were mounted. The legislative
enactment of nationwide initiative would mark an appropriate
beginning of the envisioned partnership between representatives and
the People.
Again, though, the case for adopting this amendment (regardless
of the means of doing so) would be greatly strengthened if the
initiative procedures it implements were first experimented with in
some states.
Conclusion
In a ballyhooed article, Francis Fukuyama argued that the fall of
communism marked "the end of history," or at least a consensus that
liberal democracy was the proper form of government.327  He
subsequently clarified his thesis:
liberal democracy may constitute the "end point of mankind's
ideological evolution" and the "final form of human
government ... " That is, while earlier forms of government
were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led
to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy [is] arguably free
from such fundamental internal contradictions.
Fukuyama may have overstated the case. American self-
government depends on, and was partly designed to achieve, a more
mature citizenry and polity. This has not happened. Whether or not
one characterizes this failure as a "contradiction," our ideological
evolution remains incomplete. Mankind may have arrived at
democracy as the only legitimate form of government, but the precise
form of that democracy remains an open question.
I have argued that a more direct democracy could be an
important means of promoting civic maturation. For those who
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agree, it may be time to start thinking about possible blueprints.
